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Non-technical summary
The career prospects of young academics in Germany are the subject of an intensive pub-
lic debate. During the early 2000s, the academic career path was characterized by the
availability of only few tenured professorships, high rates of dropout from an academic
career both right after completion of a PhD and at further stages as a postdoc, dispro-
portionately high rates of dropouts by females, and a high average age of appointment to
a full professorship. In the public debate, it is argued that postdocs in Germany are not
suciently independent and that there are insucient incentives to engage in excellent
research. Furthermore, postdocs in Germany often seem to lack clear career perspectives.
There is concern that excellent young academics leave Germany because of better work-
ing conditions and career prospects in countries like the U.S., or they choose to pursue a
non-academic career after completion of a PhD. Responding to some of these concerns,
the German government implemented a number of reforms during the 2000s, which aimed
at improving the attractiveness of an academic career in Germany. Part of the reforms
was the introduction of assistant professorships ('Juniorprofessor'), which should provide
a more independent alternative to the 'Habilitation'. In addition, a new salary system
with more exible and performance-oriented payment was introduced.
Based on an online survey among postdocs in the elds of economics, business eco-
nomics, sociology, and social sciences, this paper provides evidence on the perceptions and
attitudes of postdocs regarding their research incentives, working conditions, and career
prospects. Our data also allow to draw conclusions with respect to gender dierences,
especially in relation to parenthood. Based on a cluster analysis, we identify three types
of postdocs, motivated optimists, condent academics, and frustrated academics, which
dier with respect to age, gender, and the way they have obtained their PhD. Overall,
the motivated optimists are more likely to have graduated from a PhD program rather
than at the chair of a professor and they are more likely to be business economists. They
are predominantly male and are on average younger than the condent academics and the
frustrated academics. The latter might also explain the optimism among the motivated
optimists, as career prospects are shown to deteriorate with age. In contrast, over 50% of
all postdocs are pessimistic with regard to their academic career, mainly as a result of em-
ployment insecurity, and only 53% actually exhibit strong research incentives. However,
research incentives dier strongly between dierent groups and are highest for assistant
professors and for postdocs having participated in a PhD program, which may be due to
the selection of these groups. In addition, research incentives are on average higher for
female postdocs, which is, however, at least partly oset by signicantly worse (perceived)
career prospects related to parenthood. Apart from this, we nd little gender dierences.
In general, working conditions and career prospects are perceived as most insecure in
the elds of sociology and social sciences. Overall, besides the small group of assistant
professors, postdocs see only a small impact of the university reforms on their working
conditions, research perspectives, and career prospects. Another interesting nding con-
cerns the assessment of the importance of networks. Over 25% of the respondents state
that networks are more important for a successful career than academic excellence, the
exception being economists, who view networks to be of less importance. Finally, good
career prospects outside academia do not seem to reduce the motivation and research
incentive of postdocs, despite their rather uncertain academic career prospects.
Das Wichtigste in Kurze
Die Karriereaussichten junger AkademikerInnen sind in Deutschland seit einigen Jahren
Gegenstand einer intensiven oentlichen Debatte. Der universitare Karriereweg war bis-
lang aufgrund von wenig angebotenen Lebenszeit-Professuren sowie des hohen Durch-
schnittsalters bei der Berufung auf eine Professur gepragt von unklaren Karriereper-
spektiven und folglich hohen Abbrecherquoten. Sowohl in der Promotionszeit als auch
in der Postdoc-Phase entschieden sich viele junge Wissenschaftler aufgrund der Arbeits-
bedingungen und der mangelnden Karrierechancen fur eine Fortsetzung der Karriere an
auslandischen Institutionen oder auerhalb der Universitat. Es wird haug argumentiert,
dass AkademikerInnen in Deutschland unzureichende Anreize fur exzellente Forschung
aufweisen und ihre Positionen in wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen nicht hinreichend un-
abhangig sind. In den 2000er Jahren setzte die Bundesregierung einige Reformen des Hoch-
schulsystems um, die die Attraktivitat einer wissenschaftlichen Karriere an einer deutschen
Universitat steigern und dadurch im internationalen Wettbewerb konkurrenzfahiger ma-
chen sollte. Die im Rahmen der Reformen eingefuhrte Juniorprofessur zeichnet sich im
Vergleich zur traditionellen Habilitation durch mehr Unabhangigkeit aus. Das neue Besol-
dungssystem zielt auf eine exiblere und leistungsabhangige Bezahlung von Professoren
ab.
Grundlage dieser empirischen Studie ist eine Online-Befragung von an Universitaten
arbeitenden Postdocs der Facher Betriebswirtschaft, Volkswirtschaft, Sozialwissenschaf-
ten und Soziologie zu deren Wahrnehmungen und Einstellungen hinsichtlich ihrer For-
schungsanreize, Karriereaussichten und Arbeitsbedingungen. Mithilfe dieser Daten lassen
sich geschlechtsspezische oder altersabhangige Unterschiede sowie Diskrepanzen bezuglich
der Fachdisziplin und des Familienstands analysieren. Eine Clusteranalyse zeigt, dass
man zwischen drei Forscher-Typen dierenzieren kann: "Motivated optimists"(motivierte
Optimisten), "condent academics"(zuversichtliche Akademiker) und "frustrated acade-
mics"(frustrierte Akademiker). Die "motivierten Optimisten"haben uberproportional oft
ein Doktorandenprogramm absolviert, hauger einen betriebswirtschaftlichen Hintergrund,
sind im Durchschnitt junger sowie eher mannlich als die AkademikerInnen in den anderen
beiden Gruppen. Fur alle Postdocs nehmen die Karriereaussichten mit zunehmendem Al-
ter ab und 50% aller Postdocs schatzen ihre akademischen Karrierechancen als schlecht ein.
Allerdings berichten 53% der WissenschaftlerInnen von starken Forschungsanreizen, wobei
sich diese deutlich zwischen verschiedenen Gruppen unterscheiden. Weibliche, kinderlose
Postdocs, Absolventen eines Doktorandenprogramms sowie JuniorprofessorInnen haben
die grote Motivation zur wissenschaftlichen Forschung, was der Selektion dieser Grup-
pen geschuldet sein kann. Es werden keine weiteren geschlechtsspezischen Unterschiede
festgestellt und der Einuss der durchgefuhrten Reformen wird nur von Juniorprofesso-
rInnen als bedeutsam eingestuft. Postdocs aus dem Bereich der Sozialwissenschaften und
der Soziologie sind bezuglich ihrer Karriereaussichten am pessimistischsten. Bemerkens-
wert ist, dass 25% aller Befragten der Meinung sind, dass Netzwerke entscheidender als
wissenschaftliche Exzellenz fur eine akademische Karriere sind, wobei VolkswirtInnen den
Einuss von Netzwerken niedriger als Postdocs anderer Disziplinen einschatzen. Eine si-
gnikante Reduktion der Forschungsanreize infolge von guten Karrierechancen auerhalb
des universitaren Bereichs konnte nicht festgestellt werden.
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con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Keywords: Postdocs, Academic Career Prospects, Research Incentives, University Re-
forms.
JEL-Classication: A11, A29, I21, I23, J24, J49.
 Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg, IFS, IZA, ZEW.
Corresponding author: Bernd Fitzenberger, Department of Economics, Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg,
79085 Freiburg, Germany, E-mail: bernd.tzenberger@vwl.uni-freiburg.de.
 Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg. E-mail: ute.leuschner@vwl.uni-freiburg.de.
We thank the newspaper Handelsblatt for nancial support. In January 2009, the Handelsblatt published
an article written by Doris He, which was based on the same data set as this work (He, 2009). We
thank all participants of our online-survey for providing the data used in this study, and we thank Alexan-
dra Spitz-Oener for helpful comments. We are grateful to Maximilian Blomer for excellent assistance in
setting up the online survey. The responsibility for all errors is, of course, ours.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Background and Theoretical Framework 3
2.1 Background and Review of the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Life-cycle Phase Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Data and Descriptives 12
3.1 Description of Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4 Cluster Analysis of Researcher Types 14
5 Econometric Analysis 15
5.1 Research Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2 Career Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3 PhD Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4 Gender, Age, Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.5 Dierent Academic Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6 Conclusions 23
References 24
Appendix 27
1 Introduction
The academic career path in Germany is characterized by the availability of only few
tenured professorships, high rates of dropout from an academic career both right after
completion of a PhD and at further stages as a postdoc, disproportionately high rates
of dropouts by females, and a high average age of appointment to a full professorship
(BMBF, 2008). There is concern that the conditions for an academic career make aca-
demic research positions in Germany less attractive and less competitive in comparison
with both jobs outside of academia and research positions abroad (Bulmahn, 2001; Enders
and Bornmann, 2002b; Burkhardt, 2011). This may hold in particular for postdoc posi-
tions, a stage in which young academics should be most productive in research. Postdocs
typically still work under the supervision of a tenured professor, lack independence in com-
parison to assistant professors in other countries, and have fairly insecure career prospects
compared to a well-dened tenure-track system (Bareither, 2008; Buchholz et al., 2009;
Bulmahn, 2001; Janson et al., 2007). Furthermore, key decisions relating to family for-
mation are made during the postdoc phase, and there is concern that a disproportionate
number of promising female PhD's do not continue an academic career because of the in-
security and the diculties to combine an academic career with having a family (BMBF,
2008; Jung, 2011). However, little is known about the sentiments of postdocs on a statis-
tically representative basis. For this reason, we conduct a survey among postdocs in the
elds of business economics, economics, sociology, and social sciences.
The public debate reports negative sentiments and frustration among postdocs in
Germany, and it is often argued that many of the most promising young researchers
leave Germany or do not come back to Germany because of better working conditions
in countries like the United States (Bulmahn, 2001; Janson et al., 2007; Pruky, 2008).
Recognizing some of these concerns, the German government implemented various reforms
of the university system during the 2000's (Bulmahn, 2001). Regarding the postdoc
phase, the goals of the reforms were to strengthen the independence of postdocs and
their incentives for excellent research as well as to lower the age at which a successful
researcher can make the transition to a tenured professorship. Assistant professorships
('Juniorprofessur') were introduced with the right to supervise PhD students. Although,
this was a goal of the reforms, most assistant professorships do not involve tenure-track.
Over the last decade, there has been a decline of postdocs completing a Habilitation
(Handelsblatt, 2009; StBA, 2011). However, assistant professorships have by no means
replaced the Habilitation.
Based on a survey in the elds of business economics, economics, sociology, and social
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sciences, our paper contributes to the understanding of the situation and the sentiments
of postdocs in Germany. In a situation with a high dropout rate from an academic career,
we emphasize the interplay between academic and non-academic career prospects. We
rst develop a number of hypotheses regarding career transitions after the completion of
a PhD based on a theoretical framework. Drawing on our survey data, we then analyze
the research incentives, the academic background, and the career prospects of postdocs.
We also investigate their perception of the university reforms of the last decade. The
comparison across dierent elds allows us to investigate the impact of dierent non-
academic career opportunities (Chlosta et al., 2010).
Our results show quite a mixed picture. We identify three important types of postdocs:
motivated optimists, condent academics, and frustrated pessimists. Only about half of
the postdocs sees strong incentives for academic research, but there is quite a strong
condence to succeed in an academic career. There is evidence that research incentives
increase due to stronger international competition. Employment insecurity results in a
more pessimistic assessment of an academic career. The strongest research incentives and
the best career prospects were found for assistant professors ('Juniorprofessoren/innen').
Apart from this small group, the postdocs see only a small inuence of the university
reforms of the last decade on incentives and prospects for researchers. There is no evidence
for declining research incentives due to better non-academic career prospects. Female
postdocs show signicantly higher research incentives but otherwise we nd little gender
dierences. Irrespective of gender, the presence of children is associated with signicantly
worse perceived career prospects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the back-
ground, introduces a theoretical framework to analyze the career decision of a postdoc,
and develops a number of hypotheses. Section 3 describes our survey among postdocs.
Section 4 reports the result of a cluster analysis and section 5 reports our econometric
analysis. Section 6 concludes. The appendix includes additional derivations, information
about the data, and detailed empirical results. We have also prepared an additional ap-
pendix with further detailed information about the data and empirical results which we
refer to in the paper.
2
2 Background and Theoretical Framework
2.1 Background and Review of the Literature
Traditionally, a postdoc at a German university completes a second postgraduate degree
after the PhD, the so-called 'Habilitation' (postdoctoral lecture qualication) to become
eligible for a tenured professorship. After completion of the Habilitation, the postdoc can
apply for a tenured professorship, typically at other universities. During the Habilitation
phase, the postdoc typically works as an assistant at the chair of a tenured professor.
Over the last decade, there has been a decline of postdocs completing a Habilitation
(Handelsblatt, 2009; StBA, 2011). The university reforms of the last decade introduced
assistant professorships ('Juniorprofessur'). Such positions last no more than six years
and are intended to provide a more independent alternative to the Habilitation. Bulmahn
(2001) calls for the introduction of assistant professorships with a tenure-track option
to make an academic career more attractive (see also Buchholz et al. (2009) and Jung
(2011)), but the majority of assistant professorships today do not involve tenure-track.
As part of the university reforms, a new salary system for professors was introduced
(Bulmahn, 2001; Zoske, 2008): since 2005, professors can only be appointed for a profes-
sorship in the new 'W-salary system', which replaces the old, fairly rigid 'C-salary system'.
The 'W-salary system' implements a more exible and performance-oriented pay system
with lower base salaries. The base salary of assistant professors was lowered compared to
the base salary of former assistants at a chair who had received a C1-salary during the
Habilitation phase.
In addition, the debate about the best way to organize the PhD phase in Germany
has been just as intense as the debate about postdocs (BMBF, 2008). There are strong
calls for the introduction of structured U.S. style PhD programs to replace the traditional
way of completing a PhD in Germany. It is argued that a traditional PhD does not allow
PhD students to acquire a suciently broad range of research perspectives and that PhD
students have insucient independence when they are supervised by just one tenured
professor. This discussion prompted the German government in the last decade to award
the assistant professors with the right to supervise PhD students.
Even though there are strong dierences in the academic system between Germany
and, say, the U.S. (Buchholz et al., 2009), the academic system in the U.S. (and to some
extent the UK) serves as a benchmark in the discussion about university reforms in Ger-
many (Janson et al., 2007; Buchholz et al., 2009; Bulmahn, 2001). Gillmann (2006) notes
that the career prospects for postdocs in the United States are still better than in Ger-
many. Important reasons are the tenure-track-system, higher pay, and better promotion
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prospects. We rst review two studies for the U.S. (one of which involves a cross-country
comparison) and then focus on Germany. Regarding the decision about whether to con-
tinue an academic career or not, the discussion distinguishes between push factors, such
as good or bad working conditions as a postdoc and academic career prospects, and pull
factors, such as non-academic career prospects.
Fox and Stephan (2001) analyze the career-preferences and the prospects of young
researchers. The study does not include the elds economics, business economics, sociol-
ogy, and social sciences. The authors conduct a mail survey among 3.800 PhD candidates
and nd a rather pessimistic assessment of career prospects. The study argues that this
is related to the large increase in the number of PhD candidates, which reduces their
respective academic career prospects. In a follow-up study, Stephan (2008) analyzes the
academic job prospects for PhD's and their impact on research productivity in the U.S.,
Italy, and Germany for the elds of physics, life sciences, mathematics, and engineering.
The study concludes that academic career prospects for PhD's have deteriorated in all
three countries, which might lead to a fall in the number of PhD candidates. For Ger-
many, the study points to a decreasing number of postdocs completing a habilitation and
to the reduction in the number of professorships, both reecting the poor academic job
prospects. In addition, the study also nds that in the EU, the number of scientists with
a PhD hired by industry has been falling as well. As a result, Stephan sees a risk of
falling scientic productivity because an academic career has become less attractive. She
also argues that good non-academic career prospects causes a shift away from basic to
more applied research. Somewhat in contrast to the hypothesis that non-academic career
prospects after completion of a PhD have deteriorated, the recent study by Lindley and
Machin (2011) shows that the wage return to postgraduate education beyond a college
degree (including the completion of a PhD) has been rising in the U.S. and the UK. All
this suggests that future non-academic career prospects may play an important role for
both PhD's and postdocs.
The weak career prospects for postdocs in Germany are reected by the high average
age when completing a habilitation, at which non-academic career prospects may have
deteriorated compared to the options right after completion of the PhD, and the compar-
atively small number of professorships (BMBF, 2008; Fitzenberger, 2008; Schulze, 2008;
Gulker, 2011). With increasing age, postdocs may become more present-oriented and
thus less willing to invest into a risky academic career (Chlosta et al., 2010). Bareither
(2008) emphasizes that the decision to pursue an academic career in Germany involves
a big personal risk. As part of the university reforms a decade ago, the introduction of
the junior professorship and the change of the salary-system should have improved the
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independence and the working conditions of postdocs. However, because of the lack of
tenure-track option for most assistant professors and because of lower salaries, the eect
of the reforms on the research eort among postdocs may be ambiguous (Fitzenberger,
2008). In fact, Leers (2007) argues that assistant professors have no better academic
career prospects than other postdocs.
Female PhDs in Germany are less likely to continue an academic career compared
to male PhDs (BMBF, 2008; Jung, 2011). This is often attributed to the diculties
in reconciling an academic career with having a family. Correspondingly, female PhDs
may be more risk averse in their career decisions (Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Jung, 2011).
Being in a partnership and/or having children may increase the present-orientation, thus
reducing the incentives to invest in a risky academic career. Incidently, for the U.S.,
Fox and Stephan (2001) nd no signicant gender eects with regard to how insecure
career prospects aect academic decisions. This suggests that cross-country dierences in
academic systems and possibilities to reconcile an academic career with having a family
may be important.
There exists only a scarce literature which deals explicitly with career prospects of
academics in Germany. Enders and Bornmann (2002b) nd that having a position at a
university when completing the PhD is important for future academic career prospects.
In addition, the integration into the scientic community, reected by publications in
journals or participation in conferences, is associated with better future academic career
prospects. Chlosta et al. (2010) analyze the decision for an academic career in business
economics, a eld with presumably very good non-academic career prospects. The study
nds that the number of publications, work satisfaction, as well as perceived career chances
have a signicant positive eect on the decision to continue an academic career. A higher
individual rate of time preference (proxied by the presence of children) has a negative
eect. In contrast, they found no signicant eect of the expected earnings in a non-
academic job within the same sub-discipline of business economics. This result may
be due to the small number of cases and they nevertheless emphasize the importance
of monetary factors. Furthermore, because of the possibility to switch subelds within
business economics, this result does not necessarily imply that the stark dierences in
non-academic career prospects across elds have no impact on the decision to continue
an academic career.
A number of studies analyze research productivity, mobility, and qualications over
the life cycle (Heining et al., 2008, 2007; Rauber and Ursprung, 2008a,b). Rauber and
Ursprung (2008a,b) nd that research output depends strongly upon the cohort of the
researchers. Schulze et al. (2008) analyze the determinants of tenure decisions for those
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who successfully completed a habilitation in economics or business economics. The study
nds that publications are important determinants for receiving tenure, a nding also
conrmed by Heining et al. (2007), and that publications are substantially more important
in economics than in business economics.
Analyzing the international mobility of German PhDs, Enders and Bornmann (2002a)
nd no evidence for an increasing outmigration to foreign universities. However, about
25% of all economists go abroad after completion of their PhD, most of them to take a
job in the private sector. While the number of postdocs going abroad is fairly small, these
are often particularly excellent researchers. Thus, there seems to be a qualitative rather
than a quantitative problem of outmigration.
Similar to our study, Jaksztat and Briedis (2009) conduct a survey on the individual
perception and job satisfaction among postdocs and PhD candidates in nearly all elds in
Germany. The study nds a negative assessment of the Bologna{reforms. Nevertheless,
40% of the survey respondents want to pursue an academic career. In a subsequent study,
Jaksztat et al. (2010) conduct a large survey on work conditions, career plans, and compe-
tencies. They compare universities with research institutions outside of universities. The
results show that young researcher have huge concerns regarding job insecurity (mainly
because of xed-term contracts) and they nd it very dicult to plan a career.
2.2 Life-cycle Phase Framework
An academic career evolves through various stages (BMBF, 2008). Figure 1 depicts possi-
ble career transitions after the completion of a PhD. Obtaining a PhD is mainly a training
phase when the PhD candidate learns how to successfully develop and implement a major
research project which results in a signicant contribution to the literature. After com-
pleting a PhD, a person may continue his/her academic career as a postdoc at a research
institution (e.g. universities) or switch to a non-academic career. The postdoc position
also includes assistant professorships (W1 positions, 'Juniorprofessur'). A postdoc will
either eventually make the transition to a tenured professorship (W2/W3) along the aca-
demic career or exit to a non-academic career.1 In the following, we simply refer to a
tenured professorship (W2/W3) as professorship and explicitly say so when referring to a
junior professorship.
1Figure 1 excludes the posssibility of tenured postdoc research positions, e.g. as a tenured lecturer
('Akademischer Rat/Ratin'). Nowadays, such positions are rare at German universities. A sizeable
number of tenured positions as researcher do exist at research institutes. Typically, these positions
involve contract research or consulting work, which we subsume as an exit to a non-academic career as
opposed to obtaining a professorship. Our analysis also abstracts from the fact that W2/W3 professorship
may at rst involve temporary appointments and in a number of cases may not lead to tenure. Such
positions are subsumed as part of the postdoc phase.
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We conceptualize the academic career after obtaining a PhD in a life-cycle perspective
of academic training and transitions to academic and non-academic jobs (gure 1). We
focus on the postdoc phase and solve the decision problem backwards. The (present)
value of a postdoc position Vpd depends both upon the value of obtaining a tenured
professorship with associated present value Vprof and upon the value of a non-academic
career with value V na2 . Both Vprof and V
na
2 are random variables for the postdoc. The
transition probabilities along the academic career and the values of the two exits are
aected by the training, the eort choice, and the working conditions during the postdoc
phase.
The postdoc will choose the career path yielding the higher expected utility. When
Vprof exceeds V
na
2 , the postdoc makes the transition to a professorship at the next stage.
Otherwise, he/she will eventually continue in a non-academic career. To model the eort
decision during the postdoc phase, we specify
Vpd = max
e
fu(e; wc) + E max [Vprof (e; wc; aa); V na2 (e; wc; an)]g ;(1)
where u(e; wc) is the utility while being a postdoc and E max[:] is the ex ante expected
value of the future career. e denotes the eort of the postdoc and wc denotes the working
conditions of the postdoc. aa and an are anticipated shift parameters which aect the
relative attractiveness of a professorship or a non-academic career after a postdoc phase,
respectively, with @Vprof=@aa > 0 and @V
na
2 =@an > 0.
The probability for a postdoc to obtain a professorship is given by Ppd(prof) =
P (Vprof (e; wc; aa) > V
na
2 (e; wc; an) j postdoc). We assume that the postdoc chooses ef-
fort e in order to maximize Vpd. We further assume that higher eort causes a disutility
while being a postdoc (@u(e; wc)=@e < 0), but increases both future values (@Vprof=@e >
@V na2 =@e > 0), the eect being uniformly stronger for the professorship.
2 Higher eort
as a postdoc results in better training and higher research output for given working con-
ditions. We assume that the higher eort also has a positive eect on V na2 because the
postdoc training creates useful human capital for the non-academic labor market (sic!).
We assume that the working conditions (wc) are exogenous for the postdoc.3 They
have a positive eect on the current utility (@u(e; wc)=@wc > 0) and on both future
2 Here, and analogously in similar cases, we assume that @Vprof=@e > (@V
na
2 =@e) +  for some small
 > 0 and that all value functions are continuously dierentiable. Furthermore, the continuous joint
density of (Vprof (e; wc; aa); V
na
2 (e; wc; an)) is uniformly positive for all values with Vprof (e; wc; aa) =
V na2 (e; wc; an). These conditions are sucient for the formal results in the appendix.
3Obviously, this is a simplication since postdocs can search for a better postdoc position. Postdocs
doing better research are more likely to nd positions with better working conditions. In the eld of
economics, in fact, there exists a formalized international market for postdoc positions, which a number
of leading economics departments in Germany participate in. Strictly speaking, our assumption refers to
the working conditions in the current postdoc position.
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values with (@Vprof=@wc > @V
na
2 =@wc > 0). Better working conditions for research result
in better training and higher research output for a given eort. Again, we assume that
the eect is stronger for the professorship.
Furthermore, we assume that (Vprof ; V
na
2 ) both take only positive values and that they
follow a joint continuous probability distribution f(x; y) for given (e; wc; aa; an) (we omit
these arguments in the following discussion). The expected future value after the postdoc
stage is then expressed by
FV  E max [Vprof (e; wc; aa); V na2 (e; wc; an)] =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
max(x; y)f(x; y)dydx(2)
and the probability to obtain a professorship is
Ppd(prof) =
Z 1
0
Z x
0
f(x; y)dydx :(3)
In the appendix, we formally show how these expressions respond to monotone shifts
in one or both arguments of the probability distribution. Based on these results and
some technical regularity conditions (see footnote 2), we can then unambiguously sign
the eects of e, wc, aa, and an on both FV and Ppd(prof) as follows:
u e wc aa an
@FV
@u
> 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
@Ppd(prof)
@u
> 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
u denotes the arguments e; wc; aa; an
We can now continue to analyze the eort choice of the postdoc. Under standard
assumptions such as @2u(e; wc)=@e2 < 0 (increasing marginal disutility in eort) and
@2Vprof=@e
2 < 0; @2V na2 =@e
2 < 0 (decreasing returns), there exists a unique interior so-
lution for the eort choice characterized by  @u(e; wc)=@e = @FV=@e (marginal disu-
tility of eort is equal to marginal future value of higher eort). Assuming comple-
mentarity between eort and working conditions wc, i.e. @2u(e; wc)=@e @wc > 0 and
@2Vprof=@e @wc > 0; @
2V na2 =@e @wc > 0, we obtain the result that with better working
conditions eort increases and, also taking the eort choice into account, the probabil-
ity to obtain a professorship increases. Assuming complementarity between e and the
attractiveness parameters aa and an, i.e. @
2Vprof=@e @aa > 0 and @
2V na2 =@e @an > 0, we
nd that eort increases unambiguously with higher attractiveness of an academic career
aa, whereas the eect on a non-academic career an is ambiguous. Correspondingly, the
probability to pursue an academic career increases with aa and it falls with an (the latter
result causes the ambiguity of the eect of an on eort).
Our life-cycle framework emphasizes that the value of a non-academic career has an
impact on the decisions of the postdocs while still pursuing their academic career. Two
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examples shall illustrate the point. First, if the type of research aects the value of the
non-academic career, the postdoc may choose a more applied research agenda because it
may pay o in the event he/she enters a non-academic career. Second, because research
eort and working conditions positively aect the productivity in the non-academic career,
this will reinforce the research incentives during the postdoc phase.
Analogous to the career decision of the postdoc, we sketch how to analyze the PhD
phase and the decision to continue an academic career afterwards (see gure 1). In the
German case, the majority of PhDs do not continue an academic career after completion
of the PhD (BMBF, 2008). This means that the research eort and the choice of research
topics during the PhD are both aected by academic and non-academic career prospects.
Dierent elds may dier strongly with respect to the value of holding a PhD for a non-
academic career. It is often argued that among the elds considered in our study, the
payo of a PhD in a non-academic career is highest for business economics and lowest for
sociology or social sciences. Clearly, the chances to pursue either an academic career or
a non-academic career aect the career and research decisions during the PhD phase. A
higher research eort and better working (research) conditions during the PhD phase will
raise the future value of both the academic career and the non-academic career, with the
positive eect being stronger for the academic career.
2.3 Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical framework, we develop a number of hypotheses to be explored
in our empirical analysis.
The research output results in papers or monographs. This output depends upon the
research eort and the working conditions of the postdoc. The university reforms of the
last decade have intended to improve the working conditions of postdocs, in particular by
introducing junior professorships (Bulmahn, 2001) and granting them more independence.
Scientic networks play a special role for academic careers, and potentially also for the
motivation of young academics. Postdocs who think that networks are more important
than research eort for a successful academic career have less research incentives.
Hypothesis 1 (Incentives) Better working conditions in the current job enhance research
incentives of postdocs. Junior professors have the highest research incentives. Research
incentives are lower for postdocs who think that networks are more important for an
academic career.
Our theoretical framework implies that the current prospects in the non-academic la-
bor market and the future academic and non-academic career prospects aect the research
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and career decisions of a postdoc. Higher (international) competition reduces the chances
to obtain a professorship, thus reducing the research eort of a postdoc (in Germany).
However, higher (international) competition may raise the marginal return of research
eort of a postdoc regarding the value of an academic career, thus resulting in higher
research eort of postdocs.
Hypothesis 2 (Career Prospects) Better chances for a future academic career or a future
non-academic career enhance research incentives of postdocs. Better chances for a non-
academic career at present reduce research incentives of postdocs. Better chances for a
future non-academic career increase the research eorts in applied research as opposed
to basic research. The eect of higher (international) competition for professorships on
research eort is ambiguous. Better working conditions and higher research eort as a
postdoc raise both the value of a future academic career and of a future non-academic
career, with the eect being larger for an academic career.
Similar to the postdoc phase, the PhD phase in Germany has also been the subject of
a reform debate (BMBF, 2008). In Germany, the age of completion of a PhD is very high
in international comparison. Obtaining a PhD at a chair may result in less independence
and less research orientation during the PhD stage. This may be (partly) compensated if
a PhD candidate is better integrated in the research projects of the chair and the scientic
network of the chair. It is a widely held view that the eectiveness of PhD training and
mentoring is improved by the participation in structured doctoral programs (BMBF, 2008,
p. 140). Furthermore, multiple supervisors and training in advanced research oriented
course may improve the quality of PhD research and to speed up graduation.
Hypothesis 3 (PhD phase) Better supervision and mentoring as well as stronger in-
volvement in the scientic community during the PhD phase raise the research eort of
PhDs and shorten the time until completion of a PhD. Better working conditions and a
higher research eort as a PhD raise both the value of a future academic career and of
a future non-academic career for postdocs, with the eect being larger for an academic
career. This results in higher research eort during the postdoc phase.
Women are less likely to continue an academic career after completion of the PhD and
the average age at which postdocs obtain a professorship is particularly high in Germany
(BMBF, 2008; Schulze et al., 2008). One explicit goal of the university reforms was to
reduce the age of rst appointment as professor (Bulmahn, 2001). Creating independent
junior professorships with an associated time limit and greater independence should allow
postdocs to focus more on excellent research. In particular, this should benet female
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postdocs, for whom the diculties to reconcile of family and career is a strong obstacle
for an academic career. Having made the decision to work as a postdoc, female postdocs
are likely to have a stronger research interest as they have higher opportunity costs of an
academic career compared to males. Furthermore, females may see better opportunities
to pursue an academic career if the male-female gap is higher in a non-academic career.
However, females may be more risk averse than males in undertaking high-risk high-return
research projects.
At higher age and in the presence of children, postdocs value current period utility
more strongly than the future value of an academic and an non-academic career and nd
it more costly to get involved in the scientic community (see Chlosta et al., 2010 for
a similar argument). Also, older cohorts are less likely to be aected by the university
reforms. Furthermore, the higher the age, the more likely the postdoc may not have been
considered for a professorship, resulting in older postdocs being more negatively selected.
Hypothesis 4 (Gender, Age/Cohort, Children) Research incentives fall with higher age
and in the presence of children. The gender eect on research incentives is ambiguous,
depending upon whether the positive selection of females or the higher opportunity costs
of research for females dominates. Female postdocs, postdocs with children, and older
postdocs are less willing to take risks and are more likely to engage in applied research.
Our empirical analysis comprises the elds of business economics, economics, sociology,
and social sciences. By elds, the non-academic career prospects (expected earnings) are
highest in business economics (Chlosta et al., 2010) and lowest in sociology and social
sciences. Chairs in business economics have comparatively better contacts to private
rms; thus resulting in better networks to pursue a non-academic career. In order to
convince a PhD in business economics to pursue an academic career, working conditions
as a postdoc and the value of a future academic career have to be even better than for
the two other elds. The reverse argument should apply for sociology and social sciences.
Hypothesis 5 (Dierent academic elds) Postdocs in business economics (sociology and
social sciences) have the highest (lowest) value of a non-academic career. Correspondingly,
research eort is highest (lowest) in sociology and social sciences (business economics),
while the eect of the eld on the chances to obtain a professorhip is ambiguous.
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3 Data and Descriptives
3.1 Description of Survey
We conduct an email survey in September and October 2008 among postdocs who had a
position at a German university in the elds of economics, business economics, sociology
or social science. For the purpose of our survey, postdocs are dened as persons who hold a
PhD degree, including junior professors, but who do not yet have a tenured professorship.
Via an extensive internet research, we found eligible 1169 postdocs. As an incentive, the
newspaper Handelsblatt sponsored a number of temporary free newspaper subscriptions,
which were randomly distributed among the respondents.4 47% of the postdocs (546
persons) completed the survey, 7% quit during the interview, and 46% did not respond at
all. Unless indicated otherwise, we refer in the following to the sample of the 546 postdocs
who completed the survey. We think the responses are quite reliable, as the topic of the
survey is of high relevance for the respondents. Furthermore, it is an advantage that the
data were collected some time after the university reforms of the last decade. There exists
no comparable recent survey focusing on career prospects of postdocs in Germany.
The survey consists of two parts. The rst part concerns information on the current
postdoc position and on the academic background and assesses the academic and non-
academic career prospects as well as the general situation in academia. Some of the
assessment questions use a ve to six points Lickert scale. Additionally, a 'no answer'-
eld was oered. Further questions involve statements the respondents could agree or
disagree with (see Tables 11 and 12 in the additional appendix).
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes key descriptive statistics of our data set; more detailed descriptive
results can be found in the additional appendix. Among the 546 respondents, there are 360
males (66%) and 186 females (34%).5 10% of the respondents hold a foreign citizenship.
The average age in the sample is 38. Females are slighty older than males and 10% of
the postdocs are older than 45 years (Table 1 in the additional appendix). Around 50%
are married, another 30% live in a partnership, and around 40% have children. The
distribution is quite similar for females and males (Table 2 in the additional appendix).
Regarding the distribution of academic elds, about one-third graduated in Business
Economics, a quarter in Economics, another quarter in Social Sciences or Sociology, and
4Handelsblatt published some descriptive results of the survey in 2009 (He, 2009).
5Six persons did not disclose their gender. We assume them to be females, because mostly females
tend not to disclose their gender.
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the rest in Business related subjects such as Business Informatics, Industrial Engineering,
and others. On average, it took 5.6 years to obtain the PhD after completion of the
highest academic degree. 93% obtained their PhD in Germany and around 70% obtained
their PhD while working at the chair of a professor. At the time of the survey, on average
three years had passed since the completion of the PhD. 50% are now working at the
university where they obtained their PhD. Most of the postdocs are research assistants
(48%) and/or have the status of a 'Habilitand' (42%). Among the 225 postdocs pursuing
a Habilitation only 25% are women (Table 4 in the additional appendix). Regarding the
integration into the scientic community, 84% of all postdocs have attended national or
international conferences, 29% have visited another research institution, 38% have written
referee reports, 58% have published in peer-reviewed journals, and 54% have been engaged
in a third-party-funded research project. Table 10 in the additional appendix shows that
there are some gender dierences in these activities, with females being more likely to go
abroad for a research stay and males being more likely to write referee reports. We will
analyze these gender dierences further as part of the subsequent multivariate analysis.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of assessments regarding research motivation and
career prospects of the postdocs. 53% of all postdocs say that the research incentives in
their current job are rather strong or very strong. Only 29% think that the university
reforms of the last decade have improved these incentives, whereas 55% believe that
incentives have improved due to stronger competition from outside Germany. Whereas
49% assess their current non-academic employment prospects to be very good or good,
only 21% think that this will be the case in ve years from now. At the same time, merely
48% of all postdocs view their own academic career prospects as very good or rather good
and 76% say that the competition for an academic career in their eld is very strong
or strong. Furthermore, 25% think that networks are more important for a successful
career than academic excellence. 68% of all postdocs prefer an academic job at present
and 66% expect to have an academic job in 5 years. 49% of all postdocs think that the
current working conditions and the future employment prospects have a positive eect on
the motivation to engage in an academic career. 51% of all postdocs say that the recent
changes in career prospects have caused a shift towards applied research.
These ndings provide a mixed picture of the research incentives, career plans, and
career prospects of postdocs. On the one hand, the majority of postdocs is committed to
an academic career, is to some degree integrated into the scientic community, thinks that
the competition is hard, and is concerned about weak non-academic career prospects. On
the other hand, the working conditions are often not conducive to excellent research and
the university reforms have not improved the research incentives strongly enough. Due
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to career concerns, postdocs do more applied research, and networking is often perceived
to be more important than academic excellence. Based on these ndings, the newspaper
Handelsblatt concluded that a lot of postdocs are frustrated (He, 2009).
4 Cluster Analysis of Researcher Types
Next, we identify groups of postdocs based on their assessment of research motivation
and career prospects. A k-means cluster analysis with 10.000 iterations and the Jaccard
similarity measure was used to identify three types of researchers. Methodologically, as
initial group centers the last three observations of our dataset were used. We experimented
with dierent numbers of clusters, before we concluded that three clusters represent most
of the data well. In total, the cluster analysis assigns 447 postdocs to the three clusters.
The rst cluster (Type frustrated pessimists) comprises 33% of the postdocs, the second
32% (Type motivated optimists), and the third 36% (Type condent academics), see Table
2. We labeled the clusters in light of the average responses given. Table 3 shows that
the motivated optimists have the strongest research incentives and expect good career
prospects. Their research motivation improves strongly by increased competition outside
and slightly by the university reforms. In comparison, the group of condent academics
has high research incentives as well but both condent academics and frustrated pessimists
see low non-academic career prospects. Furthermore, almost all condent academics and
motivated optimists prefer an academic job now and also expect to have an academic job
in ve years. The frustrated pessimists dier strongly from the two other types. Among
them, research incentives and academic as well as non-academic career prospects are very
weak. Also, the frustrated pessimists report the weakest increase of research motivation
due to the university reforms. Alltogether, the frustrated pessimists have a low research
motivation and a very pessimistic assessment of their academic career prospects.
We analyze the dierences in the composition of the researcher types (clusters) in
Table 4. Overall, the share of females is lowest among the motivated optimists and quite
similar among the two other types. The age distribution diers strongly. Motivated
optimists are considerably younger and condent academics are on average the oldest.
The optimism among the former group may be related to the fact that non-academic
career prospects deteriorate with age. In contrast, condent academics are aware of the
low non-academic career prospects at higher age, but are condent with respect to their
academic career. Regarding elds, business economics is represented strongest among the
motivated optimists (44%) and sociology/social sciences among the condent academics
(30%). Most of the postdocs who did their PhD at the chair of a professor are to be found
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among the frustrated academics, whereas graduates of a PhD program are most strongly
represented among the motivated optimists. Similarly, the current position diers strongly
across researcher types. Whereas there are almost no assistant professors among the
frustrated academics, research assistants are most strongly represented among this group.
Those aiming for a Habilitation are mostly motivated optimists and academic lecturers
('Akademischer Rat/Ratin') have the lowest share among the frustrated academics.
5 Econometric Analysis
We explore the hypotheses presented in section 2.3. We focus on binary probit regressions
to acount for key dierences. The dependent variable is recoded as a dummy variable,
where one extreme category of interest and the closest to it (e.g. very good and rather
good) are recoded as one and the three remaining categories (e.g. neutral, rather bad,
very bad) as zero. The categorical assessment variables used as control variables in our
regressions are dened such that the two extreme categories and the closest to it are
recoded as -1 or +1, respectively, with the middle category being 0. To investigate the
robustness of our results, we also estimate ordered probit regressions which we report in
the additional appendix.
For some key relationships, we consider three dierent specications. The rst and
most parsimonious specication controls only for personal background variables as gender,
age, family status, subject of highest academic degree before PhD/of PhD, and years
since completion of highest academic degree/PhD graduation. The second specication
additionally includes the type of position, information about the PhD phase and about
the integration into the scientic community. The most comprehensive third specication
further adds some categorial assessment variables and interaction eects of all control
variables with gender. While we keep all control variables as linear eects, we only keep
those interactions which are signicant at conventional levels. All control variables (except
the female dummy) are normalized as dierences from their averages among females such
that, in the presence of interaction eects, the 'average probit coecient' of the dummy
for female reects the average gender dierence. To discuss the estimation results, we
mainly rely on the estimated average marginal eects (AME) of the control variables. We
explain this more formally in the appendix.
Note that our subsequent results are descriptive in nature, i.e. they may partly reect
reverse causality or selection eects. To give one example, participants of PhD programs
may be selected into such programs because they are more research oriented, i.e. PhD
programs may not necessarily cause higher research incentives. The goal of our analysis is
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simply to describe and interpret these relationships in light of the hypotheses put forward
above. In fact, these hypotheses often concern the direction of the association between
two endogenous variables.
5.1 Research Incentives
Our conceptual framework in section 2.2 focuses on the eort decision of the postdoc.
As reported above, 53% of the postdocs report rather strong or very strong research
incentives, i.e. for 47% of the postdocs pursuing an academic career, research incentives
are only average or weak. We explore to what extent research incentives are associated
with working conditions, background variables, and career prospects.
Table 5 reports the coecient estimates of probit regressions of various covariates on
research incentives. The most parsimonious specication (1) only shows signicant eects
for 'PhD in Germany' and Business Economics, i.e. research incentives are weaker among
those postdocs who did their PhD in Germany and those postdocs who work in Business
Economics. However, these signicant eects disappear in the more comprehensive spec-
ications (2) and (3). When conditioning on the position, the PhD background, and the
integration into the scientic community, specications (2) and (3) show that females, as-
sistant professors, and participants in PhD programs report signicantly higher research
incentives, while those who did their PhD at their current university report signicantly
lower research incentives.6 Recall that these estimates may very well reect selection ef-
fects such that e.g. participants of PhD program have a priori higher research incentives
in comparison. Even in such a case, the positive association found is interesting, thus
suggesting that those with higher research incentives prefer PhD programs.
Specication (3) further includes the assessments of career prospects, academic com-
petition, and the importance of networks. In addition to the signicant eects already
obtained for specication (2), we nd that females who have been involved in third-party-
funded projects show signicantly higher research incentives. The same holds for the per-
ception of better academic career prospects, higher competition, and for female postdocs
who feel that their working conditions improve their academic career. On the contrary,
participation at national conferences and the perception that networks are more impor-
tant than academic excellence are associated with signicantly lower research incentives.
Non-academic career prospects show no signicant eects and there are no signicant
dierences across elds. Table 6 shows the AME's for specication (3). Participation in
6Also, those with a missing or nonstandard PhD background report signicantly higher research
incentives in specication (2), but not in specication (3). We do not comment on this result as this
group involves only 4% of all observations (Table 6 in the additional appendix).
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a PhD program is associated with a 22 percent point (ppt) higher probability for strong
research incentives. The AME's for 'academic career prospects' and 'strong competition'
are 8 ppts and 10 ppts, respectively, and the perception that working conditions improve
academic career show an AME of 14 ppts. The perception that networks are more im-
portant than academic excellence is associated with a reduction of 16 ppts. For instance,
49% feel that their working conditions positively aect their academic career and 29% re-
port this eect to be negative (Figure 2). Thus, our regression estimates explain sizeable
dierences in research incentives. These results provide evidence supporting hypothesis 1.
So far, the evidence on hypothesis 2 is mixed. On the one hand, we nd positive eects of
academic career prospects, which is in accordance with hypothesis 2. On the other hand,
current and future non-academic career prospects do not aect research incentives, thus
contradicting hypothesis 2.
As reported above, only 29% of the respondents think that the university reforms of
the last decade have improved their incentives (Figure 2). Table 6 reports the estimated
AME's for a probit regression of the dummy 'reforms improved incentives'. We nd
signicantly negative eects of age, research assistant, habilitation status, and of the
perception that networks are more important than academic excellence. In contrast, there
are strong signicantly positive eects for assistant professors and for those who think
that working conditions improve the academic career. The age eect is as expected as
older postdocs are less likely to be aected by the reforms. The same holds for those who
are in a traditional postdoc position (research assistant, habilitation). At the same time,
these groups may be negatively aected by the increased competition of those benetting
from the reforms (assistant professors) and by the deterioration of the attractiveness of an
academic career because of the lower base salaries for W-professors. In contrast, assistant
professors, whose positions were introduced by the reform, those with a positive view
of conditions improving the academic career, and those who think that networks are not
more important than academic excellence are more likely to say that the reforms improved
incentives. This conrms the nding of the cluster analysis that the motivated optimists
show the best assessment of the eects of the reforms on research incentives (Table 3).
Hypothesis 2 is agnostic about the direction of the association between increased com-
petition and research incentives. The results so far show that strong academic competition
is associated with higher research incentives. Table 6 shows the estimated AME's for a
regression of the dummy variable indicating whether competition from outside improves
incentives. Again, we nd signicantly negative eects for age, the network variable,
and PhD at the current university. Competition, academic prospects, and the perception
that working conditions improve academic career show a signicantly positive associa-
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tion. These results are in line with the discussion so far. The results also reveal strong
dierences across elds, with postdocs in economics saying most strongly and postdocs in
sociology/social science least strongly that international competition improves incentives.
With a dierence of more than 30 ppts, the gap across elds is very strong. The strongest
eect exists for postdocs in economics and the smallest one for sociology/social sciences.
5.2 Career Prospects
As reported above, more than 50% of the postdocs are pessimistic about their academic
career (Figure 2), which according to our theoretical expectations leads to lower research
incentives.
Table 7 reports the estimated AME's for probit regressions of academic and non-
academic career prospects. We rst consider academic career prospects. Living in a
partnership and having children are associated with signicantly lower career prospects
(note that 'married' is the omitted category), e.g. having two children decreases the prob-
ability of good academic career prospects by 18 ppts. Assistant professor and habilitation
is associated with signicantly higher academic career prospects, with assistant professors
showing the highest condence. Some indicators of integration into the scientic com-
munity (national conferences, publications) are also associated with signicantly higher
prospects while a research stay in Germany is associated with lower prospects. Stronger
competition and the perception that networks are more important than academic excel-
lence are associated with signicantly lower prospects, while those with a positive view of
conditions improving the academic career report signicantly better prospects. Clearly,
the latter eects should not be interpreted in a causal way because optimism may be re-
ected in these variables and in the dependent variable.7 Non-academic career prospects
show no signicant eects.
Turning to non-academic career prospects, 49% of all postdocs assess their current
non-academic employment prospects to be very good or good and only 21% think that
this will be the case ve years from now (Figure 2). Table 7 reports a signicantly
and sizeable negative age eect for current non-academic career prospects, but no age
eect for prospects in ve years. Germans have signicantly better current prospects,
but there is no such eect in 5 years. Incidently, postdocs with a Master degree show
signicantly worse current prospects, but signicantly better prospects in 5 years. This is
dicult to explain. In addition, assistant professors and those having stayed at a German
7The eect of the perception of networks could be aected by a so-called 'Justication Bias'. A
postdoc who believes that his/her chances for an academic career are bad, may 'explain' (rationalize)
this with the importance of networks and not with his/her own lack of success.
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research institute show signicantly worse current prospects and no signicant eects on
prospects in 5 years. Academic career prospects show no signicant eects whereas strong
academic competition is associated with worse prospects in 5 years, possibly because the
postdocs fear that, due to the strong competition for academic positions, there will be
more competition for non-academic jobs in 5 years. Also, those with a positive view
of 'conditions improving the academic career' report signicantly better non-academic
career prospects in 5 years, but no better current non-academic career prospects. This
nding is in accordance with hypothesis 2. As expected, postdocs in sociology/social
sciences report signicantly worse current non-academic career prospects. However, there
is no such eect for career prospects in 5 years. Overall, the lower non-academic career
prospects in 5 years are less aected by the characteristics of the postdocs compared to
current prospects. Most postdocs, irrespective of their background, seem to acknowledge
that their non-academic career prospects in 5 years are only average or below average.
The lack of coherent signicant eects for indicators of the integration into the scientic
community on research incentives and career prospects are dicult to rationalize and,
thus, cast some doubt regarding hypotheses 1 and 2.
As mentioned before, a key question in the survey relates to whether the conditions in
the current job and the future employment prospects aect the motivation and incentives
('conditions improve academic career'). This variable is strongly associated with research
incentives and career prospects and 49% see a positive relationship. The probit regression
results (Table 23 in the additonal appendix) show that only career prospects (positive
eects) and the perception that networks are more important than academic excellence
(negative eect) are signicantly associated with this variable. These ndings provide
further evidence for hypotheses 1 and 2. A majority of postdocs (69%) would still select
an academic research job at present if given the choice, and a majority of postdocs expects
to have an academic research job in 5 years. There are some interesting dierences
(Table 23 in the additonal appendix). Better non-academic career prospects and the
perception that networks are more important than academic excellence are associated
with a signicantly lower desirability/probability of an academic job at present and in ve
years, whereas better academic career prospects show a signicantly positive association.
Assistant professors expect a higher probability of an academic job in 5 years but there
is no such eect at present. The habilitation status shows an even stronger signicantly
positive eect both at present and in 5 years. These results are even more remarkable in
light of the nding that habilitation status and assistant professorship show a signicantly
positive association with the perception of strong competition in the eld (Table 25 in the
additional appendix). In contrast, there are no corresponding eects on the perception
19
that networks are more important than academic excellence.
In accordance with hypothesis 2, the type of research is aected by the goal to improve
non-academic career prospects: more than 50% of the postdocs report that the recent
changes in the career prospects of young academics induced a shift more towards applied
research and over 40% say that they actually pursue applied research in order to improve
their non-academic career prospects (Figure 2). Probit regression results show that better
non-academic career prospects and the perception that networks are more important than
academic excellence are associated with a higher probability to pursue applied research
in order to improve non-academic career prospects (Table 24 in the additional appendix).
This probability is signicantly lower for postdocs in sociology or social sciences and for
older postdocs.
Our survey also involves a number of statements with which the respondents could
agree with (Table 11 in the additional appendix). 42% (51%) of the respondents agree
with the statement that many established (young) academics leave German universities
because of the moderate salaries. The approval rate for the statement that insecure
working prospects cause many young academics to leave German universities is 78%.
60% agree with the statement that an academic job is more risky than a non-academic
job. 61% perceive the lack of a tenure-track option as a aw of the introduction of
assistant professorships. Once again, these results conrm that a majority of postdocs is
very concerned about insucient career prospects in Germany, with likely negative eects
on research incentives. These results provide further support for hypotheses 1 and 2.
5.3 PhD Background
The PhD phase paves the way for an academic career. We now discuss specically the
eect of the PhD background. Note that 68% of the postdocs in our sample did their PhD
at the chair of a professor, whereas 12% obtained their PhD through a PhD program, 7%
were at a research institution, and 9% were external doctoral candidates (Table 1 and
Table 6 in the additional appendix).
Those who went through a PhD program show signicantly higher research incentives
(Table 5 and 6). The average marginal eect is 22 ppts compared to a PhD obtained
at a chair. These results are in accordance with hypothesis 3. Furthermore, former
participants of PhD programs are more convinced that stronger international competition
improves research incentives (Table 6) and report signicantly better non-academic career
prospects at present (Table 7). However, the variable does not show any signicant eect
on academic career prospects and non-academic career prospects in 5 years. Postdocs who
did their PhD at the university they are currently working at show signicantly lower
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research incentives and are signicantly less convinced that international competition
improves research incentives (Table 6). The variable shows no signicant eect on the
career prospects. This provides some evidence for hypothesis 3; however, but the lack
of signicant eects on academic career prospects is in contrast to hypothesis 3. We
nd no signicant dierences in the assessment of the strength of competition and in the
perception that networks are more important than academic excellence (Table 25 in the
additional appendix).
Overall, we nd some evidence supporting hypothesis 3. The most important result
is that a PhD obtained in a PhD program dominates the PhD at a chair of a professor in
terms of research incentives and current non-academic career prospects. These results are
consistent with the view that participation in a PhD program results in better supervision
and mentoring and that it shortens the time until completion of the PhD.
5.4 Gender, Age, Children
Gender and having children are likely to play an important role in the decision for an
academic career, as formulated by hypothesis 4. We review the results obtained so far
under this perspective. Female postdocs show signicantly better research incentives
(Table 6), but otherwise we nd little gender dierences (except for some signicant
interaction eects) in the assessment of reforms, the impact of competition, and career
prospects (Tables 6, 7 and Tables 23, 25 in the additional appendix). At the same time,
the share of females is lowest among the motivated optimists and highest among the
condent academics identied in section 4.
The regression results reported in Tables 16 and 18 in the additional appendix reveal
that the positive association of the variable 'conditions improve academic career' with
career prospects is almost exclusively due to such an eect for females. Furthermore,
the perception that networks are more important than academic excellence does not play
any role for academic career prospects of female postdocs. The contrary is true for male
postdocs. Possibly, enthusiasm plays a stronger role for those females who continue an
academic career. These results are consistent with female postdocs being a positive selec-
tion in accordance with hypothesis 4. In contrast to hypothesis 4, females do not agree
to a larger extent to the assessment that an academic research job is more risky than
a job outside of academic research (Table 20 in additional appendix) - the insignicant
point estimate would even imply the opposite. Again, this may be rationalized by female
postdocs being a positive selection.
The eects of children and partnership are mostly insignicant, with some notable ex-
ceptions. Table 7 shows that academic career prospects are signicantly worse for postdocs
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with children and for postdocs living in a partnership (note that there is no signicant
interaction with gender). Correspondingly, Table 24 in the additional appendix shows
that postdocs living in a partnership (but not postdocs with children) are signicantly
more likely to engage in applied research to improve their non-academic career prospects.
Table 25 in the additional appendix shows that both singles and postdocs with children
are signicantly more likely to say that competition is strong. These ndings and the
lack of signicance of interaction eects with gender in most cases, provide only mixed
support for hypothesis 4.
Now, we turn to the eects of age. Table 6 shows that age has no signicant eect
on research incentives (again in contradiction to hypothesis 4). However, age proves
signicantly negative in a number of cases. At higher age, there is less agreement that
the reforms and international competition improved incentives (Table 6). This is to be
expected because the reforms were implemented when the older postdocs had already
made important career steps. Correspondingly, postdocs at a middle-age (33-44 years)
most strongly agree with the statement that the introduction of junior professorship is
awed since most assistant professorships do not involve a tenure-track option (Table 11
in the additional appendix). Non-academic career prospects deteriorate at higher age
(Table 6) and there is a shift towards applied research to improve non-academic career
prospects (Table 24 in the additional appendix). Postdocs at a higher age agree to a larger
extent to the assessment that an academic research job is more risky than a job outside
of academic research (Table 20 in additional appendix), however, the eect is quite small
and insignicant. Overall, the age eects are mostly in accordance with hypothesis 4. In
particular, concerns about non-academic career prospects, but not about academic career
prospects, increase with age. This is in line with the nding that motivated optimists are
younger and condent academics are older (section 4).
5.5 Dierent Academic Fields
Our survey involves postdocs from dierent academic elds with presumably very dierent
non-academic career prospects. We nd some remarkable dierences across elds. Post-
docs in sociology/social sciences are the most concerned about insecure working prospects,
postdocs in business economics are the most concerned about the low salaries for young
academics, and economists are the most concerned about the lack of the tenure-track
options for assistant professors (Table 12 in the additional appendix, statements 6, 5, 8).
For the regression results, economics is taken as the omitted category. We review the
results obtained so far regarding dierent academic elds.
Most importantly, research incentives do not dier signicantly across elds (Table
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6), which is in contrast to hypothesis 5. Incidently, we nd only a small number of cases
with signicant dierences across elds. Economists see a stronger impact of international
competition on incentives (Table 6) and, in accordance with hypothesis 5, the perception
of non-academic career prospects is signicantly lower in sociology/social sciences than
in the other elds (Table 7). Postdocs in business economics are more likely to choose
an academic job again, if they could choose again, and expect a higher probability of an
academic job in 5 years (Table 23 in the additional appendix). Postdocs in sociology/social
sciences are more likely to undertake applied research to improve their non-academic
career prospects (Table 24 in the additional appendix). Economists are the least likely
to say that networks are more important than academic excellence, a nding which is in
accordance with the nding of Schulze et al. (2008), that the academic market is more
competitive in economics than in business economics.
Overall, research eort does not dier across elds despite dierences in non-academic
career prospects. Most likely there are important selection eects across elds. Postdocs in
business economics are committed to an academic career and they see very good academic
career prospects, possibly, because their less committed competitors have left an academic
career after a PhD. Postdocs in sociology/social sciences are also committed to their
more risky academic career (partly by intrinsic motivation) and they perceive poor non-
academic career prospects. In response, they are more likely to shift towards more applied
research.
6 Conclusions
This paper is based upon a survey among postdocs in Germany, conducted for the elds of
business economics, economics, sociology, and social sciences. We rst develop a number
of hypotheses regarding career transitions after the completion of a PhD based on a
theoretical framework. Our framework emphasizes the interaction between academic and
non-academic career paths. Based on the survey data, we analyze the research incentives,
the academic background, and the career prospects of the postdocs.
Our results show quite a mixed picture of the sentiments among postdocs in Ger-
many. Through a cluster analysis, we were able to identify three important types of
postdocs: motivated optimists, who are younger and optimistic about their academic and
non-academic career, condent academics, who are older, optimistic about their academic
career, but pessimistic about their non-academic career, and frustrated pessimists, who
are pessimistic about career prospects in general. Only about half of the postdocs sees
strong incentives for academic research but there is quite strong condence to succeed in
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an academic career. Also about half of the postdocs says that working conditions and
future career prospects increase the motivation to engage in an academic career. There
is evidence that research incentives increase due to stronger international competition.
Employment insecurity is associated with a more pessimistic assessment of an academic
career. The strongest research incentives and the best career prospects were found for
assistant professors. Apart from this small group, the postdocs see only a small inuence
of the university reforms of the last decade on incentives and prospects of the researchers,
which may be due to the specic selection of this group. Specically, the university re-
forms were more negatively assessed by older postdocs. Both younger and older academics
view their non-academic career prospects to deterioate over time. For postdocs in business
economics, we nd better non-academic career prospects than in other elds, and there
is no evidence for falling research incentives due to better non-academic career prospects.
The perception that networks are more important than academic excellence is negatively
associated with research incentives and career prospects. Finally, assistant professors,
graduates of PhD programs, but also postdocs who pursue a habilitation mostly show
better outcomes than others. Clearly, the specic working conditions of a postdoc mat-
ter. Female postdocs show better research incentives but otherwise we nd little gender
dierences. For both males and females, the presence of children is associated with worse
career prospects.
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Appendix
Formal Results for the Life-cycle Phase Model
Assume (X;Y ) are non-negative random variables with joint continuous probability den-
sity function (pdf) f(x; y) and dene
FV = E max [X;Y ] =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
max(x; y)f(x; y)dydx
and
P = P (X > Y ) =
Z 1
0
Z x
0
f(x; y)dydx :(4)
We analyze the change in FV and P (X > Y ) in response to two types of monotone
shifts in the joint distribution of (X; Y ). These results are summarized by the following
theorem.
Theorem: Consider a uniform rightward shift of X and Y , i.e. X 0 = X + a(X;Y )
with a(x; y) > 0 for all x; y, Y 0 = Y + b(X; Y ) with b(x; y)  0 for all x; y, and a(x; y) >
b(x; y)+ for some small  > 0. In response to this shift, FV strictly increases and P does
not fall. If in addition, for each  > 0, there exists  > 0, such that P (jX   Y j < ) > ,
then P strictly increases as well.
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Proof: Note that
FV (X 0; Y 0) =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
max(x+ a(x; y); y + b(x; y))f(x; y)dydx
>
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
max(x; y)f(x; y)dydx
because max(x+a(x; y); y+ b(x; y)) > max(x; y) for all x; y. This shows that FV strictly
increases.
Further note that
P (X 0 > Y 0) =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
f(x; y)I[y + b(x; y) < x+ a(x; y)]dydx ;
where I(:) denotes the indicator function. Clearly, y  x implies that y + b(x; y) <
x + a(x; y). Thus, P (X 0 > Y 0)  P (X > Y ). In addition, there exists cases for which
y > x and y + b(x; y) < x+ a(x; y) because a(x; y) > b(x; y) + . As P (jX   Y j < ) > ,
we know that P (X 0 > Y 0) increases at least by , i.e. P (X 0 > Y 0)  P (X > Y ) > . 
Corrolary: Consider a rightward shift of X, i.e. X 0 = X + a(X;Y ) with a(X;Y ) > 0,
and Y remains unchanged. In response to this shift, FV strictly increases and P does
not fall. If in addition, for each  > 0, there exists  > 0, such that P (jX   Y j < ) > ,
then P strictly increases as well.
This Corollary follows immediately as a special case of the above Theorem.
Probit Regression, Interaction Eects, and Marginal Eects
To clarify our estimation results, let us say that we estimate a probit model based on a
sample of size N as
P (Y = 1jxi; Di) =  (1 + 2xi + 3Di + 4xiDi) ;(5)
where  is the cumulative standard normal distribution, xi is a normalized control vari-
able, and Di is the gender dummy. We dene xi as deviations from the average of the
original control variable in the subsample of females, i.e.
P
Di=1
xi = 0. Then, 3 is the
average eect of the female dummy Di, i.e. the average marginal eect on the argument of
the (:) function, because 3 = 1=N1
P
Di=1
(3 + 4xi) and N1 is the number of females.
The interpretation of the coecient for xi is as usual, with 2 being the coecient for
males and 2 + 4 being the coecient for females.
To discuss the estimation results, we report the following estimated average marginal
eects (AME)
AME(x) =
1
N
NX
i=1
@P (Y = 1jxi; Di)
@xi
=
1
N
NX
i=1
(1+2xi+3Di+4xiDi)(2+4Di) ;(6)
assuming a continuous x-variable and  denoting the density of the standard normal. For
the dummy variable Di, we report
AME(D) =
1
N
NX
i=1
[P (Y = 1jxi; D = 1)  P (Y = 1jxi; D = 0)](7)
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=
1
N
NX
i=1
[(1 + 2xi + 3 + 4xi)  (1 + 2xi)] :
When x is a dummy variable, we estimate AME(x) analogous to equation (7). When
x is a categorical variable with more than two outcomes, we rely on equation (6) as an
approximation.
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the 546 respondents who completed the survey
Variable Mean Std.Deviation Min Max No. Answersa
Male (Dummy) 0.66 0.47 0 1 546
Age 38 6.35 25 72 546
Married (Dummy) 0.47 0.5 0 1 546
Partnership (Dummy) 0.31 0.46 0 1 546
Children (Dummy) 0.42 0.5 0 1 546
Business Economics 0.32 0.47 0 1 541
Economics 0.26 0.44 0 1 541
Sociology/Social Sciences 0.24 0.43 0 1 541
Other Fieldb 0.18 0.38 0 1 541
Assistant Professor 0.09 0.29 0 1 546
Research Assistant 0.48 0.5 0 1 546
Habilitand 0.42 0.49 0 1 546
Academic Lecturer 0.14 0.35 0 1 546
PhD Program (Dummy) 0.12 0.33 0 1 546
Years since completion of highest aca-
demic degree
10.8 5.65 1 44 546
Years since completion of PhD 5.6 5.04 1 36 534
Conferences (national/international) 0.84 0.36 0 1 546
Research Stay 0.29 0.45 0 1 546
Referee Reports 0.38 0.49 0 1 546
Publication peer-reviewed journal 0.58 0.49 0 1 546
Third Party Funded Projects 0.54 0.5 0 1 546
a: Number of respondents with valid answers for respective survey question.
b: Business Informatics, Industrial Engineering, others.
Table 2: Distribution of researcher types
Researcher Type Absolute Frequency Percent
Frustrated pessimists 146 33 %
Motivated optimists 142 32 %
Condent academics 159 36 %
Total 447 100 %
Note: Result of a k-means cluster analysis with Jaccard similarity measure.
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Table 4: Characterization of researcher types regarding background variables
Background
Variable
Frustrated
pessimists
Motivated
optimists
Condent
academics
Female 33 % 25 % 36 %
Below 37 years 51 % 68 % 41 %
37-40 years 23 % 21 % 29 %
Older than 40 years 26 % 11 % 30 %
Business Economics 35 % 44 % 25 %
Economics 22 % 29 % 26 %
Sociology, Social Sciences 22 % 9 % 30 %
Other Fielda 21 % 18 % 19 %
PhD program 9 % 15 % 10 %
PhD at the chair of a professor 78 % 65 % 69 %
Assistant professor 1 % 11 % 14 %
Research assistant 59 % 37 % 48 %
Habilitand 25 % 59 % 48 %
Academic lecturer 11 % 16 % 16 %
a: Business Informatics, Industrial Engineering, others.
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Table 5: Probit regression of research incentives on background and assessments
Dependent variable: Research incentives are rather strong or very strong
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.150 (0.124) 0.220 (0.133) 0.285 (0.146)
Age -0.0136 (0.0176) -0.00746 (0.0182) 0.0120 (0.0195)
Partnership -0.0599 (0.152) -0.141 (0.159) -0.0216 (0.175)
Single -0.0422 (0.181) -0.120 (0.189) 0.00474 (0.214)
Other family status -0.0319 (0.376) -0.0699 (0.399) 0.00375 (0.438)
One child -0.0463 (0.161) -0.0330 (0.167) -0.0303 (0.185)
Two children -0.133 (0.191) -0.154 (0.201) -0.126 (0.223)
More children 0.0971 (0.263) 0.0999 (0.275) 0.128 (0.302)
German -0.152 (0.217) -0.205 (0.233) -0.122 (0.251)
Years since nal degree -0.0275 (0.0235) -0.0112 (0.0241) -0.00635 (0.0262)
Master -0.107 (0.274) -0.164 (0.286) -0.379 (0.308)
Magister 0.0647 (0.203) 0.0625 (0.218) -0.131 (0.244)
Other academic degree -0.0586 (0.223) -0.0646 (0.236) -0.218 (0.255)
Years since graduation 0.00176 (0.0244) -0.0192 (0.0253) -0.0435 (0.0281)
PhD in Germany -0.581 (0.261) -0.202 (0.300) -0.0173 (0.324)
Business Studies -0.345 (0.151) -0.196 (0.168) -0.0860 (0.187)
Sociology, Social Sciences -0.163 (0.183) -0.0904 (0.197) 0.0430 (0.219)
Other subject -0.197 (0.179) -0.142 (0.191) 0.0686 (0.211)
Assistant Professor 0.749 (0.248) 0.508 (0.282)
Research Assistant 0.0550 (0.137) 0.0121 (0.152)
Status Habilitation 0.299 (0.127) 0.0869 (0.142)
Lecturer, Admin, Ocer 0.185 (0.187) 0.0644 (0.204)
PhD program 0.436 (0.226) 0.729 (0.255)
PhD research institution 0.154 (0.246) -0.0708 (0.274)
External Phd scholarship 0.112 (0.208) 0.0268 (0.226)
Other PhD 0.703 (0.377) 0.594 (0.411)
PhD current university -0.217 (0.128) -0.299 (0.141)
National conferences -0.0781 (0.163) -0.596 (0.191)
International conferences 0.179 (0.154) 0.226 (0.173)
German research institute -0.212 (0.251) -0.202 (0.275)
Foreign research institute 0.169 (0.144) 0.198 (0.159)
Referee reports 0.112 (0.147) 0.0635 (0.163)
Publications 0.0797 (0.136) 0.0265 (0.151)
Third-party project 0.0721 (0.151) 0.192 (0.166)
Third-party projectfem 0.363 (0.254) 0.576 (0.283)
Prospects outside, dummy -0.109 (0.102)
Prospects outside 5y, dummy 0.0411 (0.0971)
Prospects academia, dummy 0.290 (0.0953)
Competition academia, dummy 0.373 (0.134)
Networks -0.545 (0.130)
Conditions prospects, dummy 0.498 (0.0838)
No. observations 529 529 528
Standard errors in parentheses.  p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 6: Average marginal eects for probit regressions of research incentives, reforms,
and international competition
Dependent Research Incentives Reforms improved Competition outside
Variable Incentivesa improved Incentivesb
Female 0.0789 (0.0396) 0.0578 (0.0430) 0.00140 (0.0440)
Age 0.00379 (0.00547) -0.0145 (0.00683) -0.0149 (0.00716)
Partnership -0.0127 (0.0487) 0.0305 (0.0473) 0.0260 (0.0537)
Single -0.00562 (0.0597) -0.0181 (0.0577) 0.0820 (0.0651)
Other family status -0.0176 (0.122) 0.0372 (0.116) -0.158 (0.126)
One child -0.0161 (0.0515) -0.0584 (0.0520) 0.0526 (0.0560)
Two children -0.0433 (0.0620) -0.0184 (0.0626) 0.0473 (0.0670)
More children 0.0393 (0.0842) 0.143 (0.0806) 0.0690 (0.0953)
German -0.0246 (0.0700) 0.0879 (0.0729) -0.0528 (0.0777)
Years since nal degree -0.000846 (0.00736) 0.000565 (0.00767) 0.00397 (0.00985)
Master -0.106 (0.0860) -0.0670 (0.0865) 0.0156 (0.0939)
Magister -0.0386 (0.0678) -0.121 (0.0770) 0.0360 (0.0737)
Other academic degree -0.0745 (0.0708) 0.126 (0.0729) 0.175 (0.0849)
Years since graduation -0.0147 (0.00776) 0.00370 (0.00781) 0.0114 (0.00959)
PhD in Germany -0.00743 (0.0906) 0.108 (0.0936) 0.164 (0.0912)
Business Studies -0.0199 (0.0522) 0.0693 (0.0489) -0.0931 (0.0565)
Sociology, Social Sciences 0.00912 (0.0610) -0.0743 (0.0619) -0.317 (0.0621)
Other subject 0.0173 (0.0589) 0.0218 (0.0570) -0.236 (0.0609)
Assistant Professor 0.147 (0.0783) 0.201 (0.0693) 0.0230 (0.0817)
Research Assistant -0.00252 (0.0425) -0.0367 (0.0432) -0.0327 (0.0463)
Status Habilitation 0.0265 (0.0395) -0.106 (0.0401) 0.101 (0.0430)
Lecturer, Admin, Ocer 0.00972 (0.0568) -0.0165 (0.0547) 0.0722 (0.0640)
PhD program 0.222 (0.0695) 0.0357 (0.0677) 0.147 (0.0752)
PhD research institution -0.00597 (0.0758) -0.103 (0.0779) 0.0139 (0.0792)
External PhD scholarship 0.00460 (0.0629) -0.0227 (0.0675) 0.0133 (0.0702)
Other PhD 0.197 (0.114) 0.157 (0.105) -0.0411 (0.117)
PhD current university -0.0888 (0.0389) -0.0185 (0.0388) -0.0876 (0.0439)
National conferences -0.168 (0.0518) -0.0375 (0.0501) -0.0713 (0.0560)
International conferences 0.0624 (0.0479) 0.0116 (0.0484) -0.0455 (0.0532)
German research institute -0.0527 (0.0771) -0.0640 (0.0784) -0.0437 (0.0867)
Foreign research institute 0.0556 (0.0443) 0.00475 (0.0428) 0.0813 (0.0478)
Referee reports 0.0209 (0.0456) 0.0504 (0.0445) 0.0856 (0.0491)
Publications 0.0109 (0.0420) -0.0156 (0.0412) 0.0326 (0.0458)
Third-party project 0.106 (0.0393) 0.0178 (0.0382) -0.0431 (0.0437)
Prospects outside -0.0365 (0.0282) -0.0185 (0.0278) -0.0316 (0.0310)
Prospects outside 5y 0.0161 (0.0270) 0.0328 (0.0260) 0.0127 (0.0296)
Prospects academia 0.0813 (0.0259) 0.0263 (0.0276) 0.0641 (0.0294)
Competition academia 0.100 (0.0363) 0.0440 (0.0365) 0.0731 (0.0383)
Networks -0.155 (0.0345) -0.147 (0.0339) -0.0630 (0.0377)
Conditions prospects 0.143 (0.0210) 0.0696 (0.0234) 0.0581 (0.0255)
No. observations 528 503 474
Standard errors in parentheses.  p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The results for research incentives are based on specication (3) in Table 5.
a: Dependent Variable: Reforms improved or slightly improved incentives.
b: Dependent Variable: International competition improved or slightly improved incentives.
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Table 7: Average marginal eects for probit regressions of career prospects
Dependent Good academic Good non-academic Good non-academic Career
Variable Career Prospectsa Career Prospectsb Prospects in 5 yearsc
Female 0.0476 (0.0388) -0.0338 (0.0437) -0.0237 (0.0361)
Age -0.00704 (0.00639) -0.0260 (0.00689) -0.00181 (0.00569)
Partnership -0.105 (0.0486) 0.00393 (0.0528) -0.0607 (0.0462)
Single -0.0712 (0.0586) 0.0109 (0.0641) 0.00971 (0.0534)
Other family status -0.0619 (0.111) 0.0419 (0.132) 0.0713 (0.105)
One child -0.123 (0.0503) -0.0788 (0.0557) -0.0395 (0.0491)
Two children -0.181 (0.0596) -0.0650 (0.0669) -0.0129 (0.0567)
More children -0.250 (0.0865) 0.0588 (0.0922) 0.0225 (0.0779)
German -0.0141 (0.0677) 0.135 (0.0749) 0.0459 (0.0647)
Years since nal degree -0.000406 (0.00759) -0.00296 (0.00822) -0.000183 (0.00703)
Master 0.0376 (0.0851) -0.171 (0.0921) 0.154 (0.0762)
Magister 0.0866 (0.0654) -0.102 (0.0762) -0.00272 (0.0693)
Other academic degree 0.0935 (0.0688) 0.0356 (0.0777) 0.0880 (0.0648)
Years since graduation 0.00258 (0.00779) 0.0154 (0.00831) 0.00156 (0.00718)
PhD in Germany -0.128 (0.0846) 0.0260 (0.0926) 0.0984 (0.0843)
Business Studies 0.0613 (0.0510) 0.0929 (0.0541) 0.0184 (0.0466)
Sociology, Social Sciences 0.00942 (0.0591) -0.144 (0.0646) -0.0458 (0.0591)
Other subject -0.0360 (0.0572) 0.0352 (0.0619) -0.000133 (0.0541)
Assistant Professor 0.271 (0.0752) -0.215 (0.0782) -0.0113 (0.0643)
Research Assistant -0.0402 (0.0412) -0.0930 (0.0459) -0.0984 (0.0387)
Status Habilitation 0.160 (0.0367) -0.0680 (0.0439) -0.00434 (0.0379)
Lecturer, Admin, Ocer -0.0707 (0.0558) -0.0308 (0.0614) -0.0949 (0.0519)
PhD program -0.0189 (0.0645) 0.139 (0.0712) 0.00337 (0.0622)
PhD research institution 0.0343 (0.0726) 0.0436 (0.0792) -0.118 (0.0734)
External PhD scholarship 0.0218 (0.0644) -0.0458 (0.0735) -0.0620 (0.0667)
Other PhD 0.128 (0.107) -0.0632 (0.119) 0.0154 (0.0945)
PhD current university -0.0300 (0.0388) 0.0179 (0.0429) 0.0220 (0.0369)
National conferences 0.152 (0.0486) -0.0650 (0.0548) -0.0466 (0.0472)
International conferences -0.0291 (0.0470) 0.102 (0.0524) -0.00851 (0.0455)
German research institute -0.158 (0.0752) -0.284 (0.0867) -0.135 (0.0855)
Foreign research institute 0.0596 (0.0429) -0.0317 (0.0478) -0.0413 (0.0415)
Referee reports 0.102 (0.0429) -0.0267 (0.0490) 0.0362 (0.0418)
Publications 0.101 (0.0392) 0.0470 (0.0448) 0.0413 (0.0395)
Third-party project -0.0399 (0.0381) 0.0736 (0.0415) 0.00598 (0.0358)
Prospects outside 0.0318 (0.0274) - -
Prospects outside 5y -0.00799 (0.0262) - -
Prospects academia - 0.0135 (0.0296) 0.0147 (0.0256)
Competition academia -0.0638 (0.0361) -0.0378 (0.0393) -0.0632 (0.0317)
Networks -0.124 (0.0333) 0.0281 (0.0375) -0.0376 (0.0326)
Conditions prospects 0.145 (0.0192) 0.0335 (0.0251) 0.0747 (0.0220)
No. observations 528 528 528
Standard errors in parentheses.  p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
a: Dependent Variable: academic career prospects rather good or very good.
b: Dependent Variable: non-academic career prospects rather good or very good.
c: Dependent Variable: non-academic career prospects in ve years rather good or very good.
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Figure 1: Career path after PhD
Ph.D. in a 
certain field
Postdoc
Vpd
Exit to non!academic
career
Vna1
Associate/ Full
Professor (W2/W3)
Vprof
Exit to non!academic
career
Vna2
Non!academic Career
Note: This gure depicts in a stylized way the possible career transitions after obtaining
a PhD. The variable V denotes the expected value (utility) after having reached a certain
stage of the career.
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Figure 2: Assessments of research motivation and career prospects
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Figure 2: Assessments of research motivation and career prospects <continued>
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Table 9: Summary of all variables and their abbreviations (B)
Abbreviation in all Variable type Variable name
regression tables Dummy is equal to one if the respondent...
National conferences Dummy ...attended national conferences.
International conferences Dummy ...attended International conferences.
German research institute Dummy ...spent time at another German research
institute/university to do research.
Foreign research institute Dummy ...spent time at another foreign research
institute/university to do research.
Referee reports Dummy ...wrote referee reports.
Publications Dummy ...published in peer-reviewed journals or
in a similar publication forum.
Third party funded project Dummy ...cooporated in academic third-party-funded projects.
... when he was a doctoral candidate.
Abbreviation in all Variable type Question
regression tables
Prospects outside Ordinally scaled "How do you view your current
employment prospects outside of academic research?"
Prospects outside in 5y Ordinally scaled "How do you view your current
employment prospects outside of academic research
ve years from now, assuming that you
continue working in an academics job?"
Prospects in academia Ordinally scaled "How do you assess your own prospects
to successfully pursue an academic career?"
Competition in academia Ordinally scaled "How strong is the competition for a
successful academic career in your eld?"
Networks Ordinally scaled "What ist the importance of networking
(networks) to pursue an academic career?"
Conditions and motivation Ordinally scaled "How do the conditions in your current job
and your future employment prospects aect your
motivation/incentives to engage in an academic career?"
Abbrevation, dummy Dummy Original Variable recoded as binary variable.
Abbrevationfem Interaction term Interaction eect with gender (female dummy).
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Additional Appendix for the paper
'Career Prospects of Postdocs in Germany'
By Bernd Fitzenberger and Ute Leuschner
Tables
Table 1: Age distribution of the postdocs in classes and sex ratio
Classes Women (n) Women Men (n) Men All (n) All
Below 33 years 20 11 % 58 16 % 78 14 %
33-36 years 62 33 % 137 38 % 199 37 %
37-40 years 44 24 % 88 24 % 132 24 %
41-44 years 33 18 % 45 13 % 78 15 %
Older than 44 27 14 % 32 9 % 59 11 %
Sex ratio 186 34 % 360 66 % 546 100 %
Table 2: Partnership status and children by sex
Status Women (n) Women Men (n) Men All (n) All
Married 85 46 % 173 48 % 258 47 %
Partnership 50 27 % 120 32 % 170 31 %
Single 46 25 % 56 16 % 102 19 %
No answer 5 2 % 11 3 % 16 3 %
Children
No children 103 55 % 212 59 % 315 58 %
One child 46 25 % 70 19 % 116 21 %
Two children 30 16 % 52 15 % 82 15 %
Three or more 7 4 % 26 7 % 33 6 %
children
Table 3: Subject of the highest academic degree and of the PhD
Subject Highest Academic Degree (before PhD) Subject PhD
Subject Women Men All Women Men All
Business Economics 24 % 33 % 30 % 27 % 35 % 32 %
Economics 19 % 23 % 22 % 25 % 26 % 26 %
Sociology, 28 % 18 % 19 % 33 % 20 % 24 %
Social Sciences
Business Informatics, 34 % 26 % 29 % 15 % 19 % 18 %
Ind. Engineering,
Other
1
Table 4: Current employment status (multiple answers possible)
Status Women (n) Women Men (n) Men All (n) All
Assistant professor 19 10 % 30 8 % 49 9 %
(Juniorprofessor/in)
Research assistant 95 51 % 168 47 % 263 48 %
Habilitand 58 31 % 170 47 % 228 42 %
Academic lecturer 18 10 % 59 16 % 77 14 %
Do not work any-
more in academia
9 5 % 14 4 % 23 4%
Other 32 17 % 40 11 % 72 13 %
Table 5: Highest academic degree before PhD
Degree Women Men All
Master 9 % 6 % 7 %
Magister 14 % 10 % 11 %
Diplom 65 % 78 % 74 %
No answer 12 % 6 % 8 %
Table 6: Did you obtain your PhD through a PhD programm
(e.g. Graduiertenkolleg, PhD-Programm, Graduiertenschule)?
Item Females (n) Females Men (n) Men All (n) All
Yes 19 10 % 48 13 % 67 12 %
No, I did my PhD at the
chair of a professor
123 66 % 250 70 % 373 68 %
No, I did my PhD at a re-
search institution
16 9 % 21 6 % 37 7 %
External doctoral candi-
date, non academic job or
scholarship
20 11 % 30 8 % 50 9 %
Other/No answer 8 4 % 11 3 % 19 4 %
2
Table 7: Years since completion of highest academic degree before PhD
Classes Females (n) Females Males (n) Males All (n) All
5 years and less 14 8 % 35 10 % 49 9 %
6-9 years 75 40 % 150 42 % 225 41 %
10-13 years 49 26 % 121 33 % 170 31 %
14-17 years 27 15 % 27 7 % 54 10 %
18-21 years 12 6 % 10 3 % 22 4 %
More than 21
years
9 5 % 17 5 % 26 5 %
Table 8: Years since completion of PhD
Classes Females (n) Females Males (n) Males All (n) All
1-2 years 41 22 % 92 26 % 133 24 %
3-4 years 47 25 % 99 28 % 146 27 %
5-6 years 33 18 % 76 21 % 109 20 %
7-9 years 34 18 % 51 14 % 85 16 %
More than 9
years
31 17 % 42 12 % 73 13 %
Table 9: Years between highest academic degree and completion of PhD
Classes Females (n) Females Males (n) Males All (n) All
Less than 2 years 15 9 % 25 7 % 40 8 %
2-3 years 15 8 % 35 10 % 50 9 %
4 years 32 18 % 75 21 % 107 20 %
5 years 34 19 % 67 19 % 101 19 %
6 years 29 16 % 72 21 % 101 19 %
7-9 years 43 24 % 62 18 % 105 20 %
More than 9
years
11 6 % 14 4 % 25 5 %
3
Table 10: Integration in the scientic community as PhD student
(multiple answers possible)
Item Females (n) Females Males (n) Males All (n) All
National Conferences 133 72 % 283 79 % 416 76 %
International 117 63 % 242 67 % 359 66 %
Conferences
Research Stay at a 10 5 % 21 6 % 31 6 %
German institute/
university
Research Stay at a 59 32 % 82 23 % 141 26%
foreign institute/
university
Referee Reports 51 27 % 158 44 % 209 38 %
Publications in 96 52 % 220 61 % 316 58 %
peer-reviewed journals
Third party 96 52 % 200 56 % 296 54 %
funded projects
No participation 25 13 % 32 9 % 57 10 %
Other 14 8 % 10 3 % 24 4 %
4
Table 11: Agreement with statements by age
Statement 32
years
and
younger
33-36
years
37-40
years
41-44
years
45
years
and
older
All
(1) The implementation of
junior-professorship has improved
the academic career prospects of
those who want to stay in academia.
36 % 21 % 13 % 22 % 22 % 21 %
(2) As a result of the moderate
salaries many established academics
leave German universities in order
to work at universities/research in-
stitutions abroad.
51 % 47 % 36 % 44 % 27 % 42 %
(3) As a result of the moder-
ate salaries many established aca-
demics leave German universities in
order to work outside of academic
research.
40 % 25 % 24 % 31 % 34 % 28 %
(4) As a result of the moderate
salaries many young academics leave
German universities in order to work
at universities/research institutions
abroad.
60 % 61 % 46 % 50 % 32 % 52 %
(5) As a result of the moderate
salaries many young academics leave
German universities in order to work
outside of academic research.
63 % 56 % 46 % 45 % 36 % 51 %
(6) As a result of the in-
secure working prospects (part-
time work, temporary employment),
many young academics leave Ger-
man universities.
59 % 78 % 80 % 87 % 81 % 78 %
(7) In comparison to a job outside
of academic research, an academic
research job is more risky.
50 % 64 % 65 % 60 % 46 % 60 %
(8) The introduction of Junior
Professorship is awed because most
positions do not involve a tenure-
track option.
55 % 66 % 60 % 63 % 51 % 61 %
5
Table 12: Agreement with statements by elds
Statement Business
Eco-
nomics
Eco-
nomics
Sociology,
Social
Sciences
Business
Infor-
matics,
Industrial
Engineer-
ing, Others
All
(1) The implementation of
junior-professorship has improved
the academic career prospects of
those who want to stay in academia.
23 % 21 % 24 % 17 % 21 %
(2) As a result of the moderate
salaries many established academics
leave German universities in order
to work at universities/research in-
stitutions abroad.
44 % 46 % 38 % 39 % 42 %
(3) As a result of the moder-
ate salaries many established aca-
demics leave German universities in
order to work outside of academic
research.
28 % 22 % 32 % 34 % 28 %
(4) As a result of the moderate
salaries many young academics leave
German universities in order to work
at universities/research institutions
abroad.
56 % 60 % 44 % 46 % 52 %
(5) As a result of the moderate
salaries many young academics leave
German universities in order to work
outside of academic research.
61 % 48 % 40 % 49 % 51 %
(6) As a result of the in-
secure working prospects (part-
time work, temporary employment),
many young academics leave Ger-
man universities.
73 % 78 % 85 % 67 % 78 %
(7) In comparison to a job outside
of academic research, an academic
research job is more risky.
59 % 63 % 58 % 62 % 60 %
(8) The introduction of Junior
Professorships is awed because
most positions do not involve a
tenure-track option.
55 % 73 % 61 % 55 % 61 %
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Table 13: How are the incentives in your current job to do excellent academic research?
(1) (2) (3)
Incentives research Incentives research bin Marginal Eects
main
Women 0.0986 (0.109) 0.285 (0.146) 0.0789 (0.0396)
Age 0.00429 (0.0155) 0.0120 (0.0195) 0.00379 (0.00547)
Partnership 0.125 (0.132) -0.0216 (0.175) -0.0127 (0.0487)
Single -0.0973 (0.159) 0.00474 (0.214) -0.00562 (0.0597)
Other18 0.352 (0.326) 0.00375 (0.438) -0.0176 (0.122)
One child 0.00334 (0.139) -0.0303 (0.185) -0.0161 (0.0515)
Two children -0.0718 (0.167) -0.126 (0.223) -0.0433 (0.0620)
More children 0.255 (0.228) 0.128 (0.302) 0.0393 (0.0842)
German -0.0181 (0.188) -0.122 (0.251) -0.0246 (0.0700)
Years since nal degree -0.0132 (0.0200) -0.00635 (0.0262) -0.000846 (0.00736)
Master -0.220 (0.235) -0.379 (0.308) -0.106 (0.0860)
Magister 0.215 (0.185) -0.131 (0.244) -0.0386 (0.0678)
Other23 -0.123 (0.193) -0.218 (0.255) -0.0745 (0.0708)
Years since graduation -0.0182 (0.0210) -0.0435 (0.0281) -0.0147 (0.00776)
PhD in Germany 0.0667 (0.235) -0.0173 (0.324) -0.00743 (0.0906)
Business Studies -0.158 (0.139) -0.0860 (0.187) -0.0199 (0.0522)
Sociology SocialScience -0.0636 (0.161) 0.0430 (0.219) 0.00912 (0.0610)
Other30 0.0390 (0.157) 0.0686 (0.211) 0.0173 (0.0589)
Assistant Professor 0.283 (0.202) 0.508 (0.282) 0.147 (0.0783)
Research Assistant 0.0931 (0.116) 0.0121 (0.152) -0.00252 (0.0425)
Status Habilitation 0.0163 (0.109) 0.0869 (0.142) 0.0265 (0.0395)
Lecturer Admin Ocer -0.0512 (0.155) 0.0644 (0.204) 0.00972 (0.0568)
PhD program 0.344 (0.182) 0.729 (0.255) 0.222 (0.0695)
PhD research institution 0.00434 (0.200) -0.0708 (0.274) -0.00597 (0.0758)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.101 (0.175) 0.0268 (0.226) 0.00460 (0.0629)
Other27 0.583 (0.298) 0.594 (0.411) 0.197 (0.114)
PhD current university -0.227 (0.107) -0.299 (0.141) -0.0888 (0.0389)
National conferences -0.476 (0.140) -0.596 (0.191) -0.168 (0.0518)
International conferences 0.111 (0.129) 0.226 (0.173) 0.0624 (0.0479)
German research institute -0.0410 (0.209) -0.202 (0.275) -0.0527 (0.0771)
Foreign research institute 0.103 (0.120) 0.198 (0.159) 0.0556 (0.0443)
Referee reports 0.0106 (0.122) 0.0635 (0.163) 0.0209 (0.0456)
Publications 0.131 (0.112) 0.0265 (0.151) 0.0109 (0.0420)
Third party funded project 0.0139 (0.124) 0.192 (0.166) 0.106 (0.0393)
Prospects outside cat 0.0159 (0.0758) -0.109 (0.102) -0.0365 (0.0282)
Prospects outside 5y cat 0.0323 (0.0740) 0.0411 (0.0971) 0.0161 (0.0270)
Prospects academia cat 0.311 (0.0733) 0.290 (0.0953) 0.0813 (0.0259)
Competition academia cat 0.440 (0.0998) 0.373 (0.134) 0.100 (0.0363)
Networks n -0.456 (0.0958) -0.545 (0.130) -0.155 (0.0345)
Conditions prospects cat 0.477 (0.0649) 0.498 (0.0838) 0.143 (0.0210)
Third party funded projectI 0.405 (0.211) 0.576 (0.283)
N 528 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=very weak, 2=rather weak
3=average 4=rather strong, 5=very strong
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=rather strong + very strong, 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 14: In the last years, some political reforms of the university system in Germany were implemented
(e.g. change from C-salary system to the W-system, introduction of junior professorship, more power of
the deans). Did the motivation/incentives to do excellent academic research change due to these reforms?
(1) (2) (3)
Incentives due reforms Incentives due reforms bin Marginal eects
main
Women 0.143 (0.113) 0.124 (0.168) 0.0578 (0.0430)
Age -0.0286 (0.0175) -0.0505 (0.0273) -0.0145 (0.00683)
Partnership 0.233 (0.136) 0.205 (0.189) 0.0305 (0.0473)
Single 0.0967 (0.162) 0.00850 (0.228) -0.0181 (0.0577)
Other18 0.351 (0.330) 0.269 (0.455) 0.0372 (0.116)
One child -0.122 (0.145) -0.153 (0.206) -0.0584 (0.0520)
Two children 0.0770 (0.171) -0.0538 (0.248) -0.0184 (0.0626)
More children 0.390 (0.233) 0.509 (0.316) 0.143 (0.0806)
German -0.0348 (0.196) 0.360 (0.288) 0.0879 (0.0729)
Years since nal degree -0.0106 (0.0211) 0.00922 (0.0305) 0.000565 (0.00767)
Master 0.206 (0.247) -0.220 (0.341) -0.0670 (0.0865)
Magister -0.0981 (0.188) -0.529 (0.312) -0.121 (0.0770)
Other23 0.0776 (0.211) 0.388 (0.290) 0.126 (0.0729)
Years since graduation 0.0255 (0.0220) 0.000974 (0.0314) 0.00370 (0.00781)
PhD in Germany 0.492 (0.254) 0.348 (0.371) 0.108 (0.0936)
Business Studies 0.117 (0.142) 0.263 (0.192) 0.0693 (0.0489)
Sociology SocialScience -0.122 (0.201) 0.0273 (0.294) -0.0743 (0.0619)
Other30 -0.0305 (0.183) 0.403 (0.251) 0.0218 (0.0570)
Assistant Professor 0.679 (0.209) 0.765 (0.277) 0.201 (0.0693)
Research Assistant -0.107 (0.120) -0.180 (0.170) -0.0367 (0.0432)
Status Habilitation -0.156 (0.112) -0.396 (0.159) -0.106 (0.0401)
Lecturer Admin Ocer -0.0229 (0.156) -0.107 (0.214) -0.0165 (0.0547)
PhD program 0.144 (0.187) 0.0615 (0.267) 0.0357 (0.0677)
PhD research institution 0.00747 (0.211) -0.359 (0.305) -0.103 (0.0779)
ExternalPhd scholarship -0.254 (0.218) -0.426 (0.329) -0.0227 (0.0675)
Other27 0.552 (0.299) 0.536 (0.415) 0.157 (0.105)
PhD current university -0.0553 (0.109) -0.0959 (0.152) -0.0185 (0.0388)
National conferences -0.201 (0.141) -0.154 (0.196) -0.0375 (0.0501)
International conferences 0.0373 (0.135) 0.00799 (0.190) 0.0116 (0.0484)
German research institute -0.130 (0.217) -0.150 (0.306) -0.0640 (0.0784)
Foreign research institute 0.0669 (0.121) 0.00334 (0.169) 0.00475 (0.0428)
Referee reports -0.0395 (0.126) 0.165 (0.174) 0.0504 (0.0445)
Publications -0.0231 (0.115) -0.0553 (0.161) -0.0156 (0.0412)
Third party funded project 0.0874 (0.108) 0.0394 (0.150) 0.0178 (0.0382)
Prospects outside cat 0.00696 (0.0781) -0.0594 (0.109) -0.0185 (0.0278)
Prospects outside 5y cat 0.0875 (0.0754) 0.129 (0.101) 0.0328 (0.0260)
Prospects academia cat 0.0972 (0.0760) 0.133 (0.108) 0.0263 (0.0276)
Competition academia cat 0.0671 (0.102) 0.177 (0.144) 0.0440 (0.0365)
Networks n -0.448 (0.0968) -0.569 (0.139) -0.147 (0.0339)
Conditions prospects cat 0.262 (0.0662) 0.243 (0.0929) 0.0696 (0.0234)
Sociology SocialScienceI -0.574 (0.262) -0.785 (0.402)
Other30I -0.432 (0.301) -1.216 (0.473)
ExternalPhd scholarshipI 0.354 (0.373) 1.155 (0.559)
N 503 503 503
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=decreased
2=slightly decreased, 3=not changed, 4=slightly improved, 5=improved
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=slightly improved + improved, 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 15: Has increased competition from outside Germany changed the motiva-
tion/incentives to do excellent academic research?
(1) (2) (3)
Competition outside Competition outside bin Marginal eects
main
Women -0.0134 (0.118) 0.00458 (0.149) 0.00140 (0.0440)
Age -0.0364 (0.0175) -0.0487 (0.0245) -0.0149 (0.00716)
Partnership 0.158 (0.143) 0.0851 (0.182) 0.0260 (0.0537)
Single 0.291 (0.172) 0.269 (0.222) 0.0820 (0.0651)
Other18 -0.403 (0.361) -0.517 (0.429) -0.158 (0.126)
One child 0.114 (0.151) 0.173 (0.190) 0.0526 (0.0560)
Two children 0.115 (0.181) 0.155 (0.227) 0.0473 (0.0670)
More children 0.359 (0.262) 0.226 (0.323) 0.0690 (0.0953)
German -0.0244 (0.206) -0.173 (0.264) -0.0528 (0.0777)
Years since nal degree -0.0124 (0.0255) 0.0130 (0.0334) 0.00397 (0.00985)
Master 0.0703 (0.254) 0.0512 (0.318) 0.0156 (0.0939)
Magister 0.362 (0.198) 0.118 (0.250) 0.0360 (0.0737)
Other23 0.500 (0.227) 0.573 (0.292) 0.175 (0.0849)
Years since graduation 0.0487 (0.0256) 0.0372 (0.0326) 0.0114 (0.00959)
PhD in Germany 0.373 (0.248) 0.537 (0.311) 0.164 (0.0912)
Business Studies -0.278 (0.152) -0.305 (0.193) -0.0931 (0.0565)
Sociology SocialScience -0.974 (0.181) -1.039 (0.226) -0.317 (0.0621)
Other30 -0.743 (0.169) -0.775 (0.214) -0.236 (0.0609)
Assistant Professor -0.130 (0.217) 0.0754 (0.277) 0.0230 (0.0817)
Research Assistant -0.152 (0.125) -0.107 (0.157) -0.0327 (0.0463)
Status Habilitation 0.112 (0.119) 0.331 (0.148) 0.101 (0.0430)
Lecturer Admin Ocer 0.192 (0.172) 0.237 (0.218) 0.0722 (0.0640)
PhD program 0.385 (0.199) 0.483 (0.257) 0.147 (0.0752)
PhD research institution -0.0228 (0.211) 0.0456 (0.268) 0.0139 (0.0792)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.00284 (0.191) 0.0437 (0.238) 0.0133 (0.0702)
Other27 -0.0604 (0.315) -0.135 (0.396) -0.0411 (0.117)
PhD current university -0.225 (0.119) -0.287 (0.150) -0.0876 (0.0439)
National conferences -0.174 (0.151) -0.234 (0.190) -0.0713 (0.0560)
International conferences 0.00501 (0.143) -0.149 (0.181) -0.0455 (0.0532)
German research institute -0.211 (0.224) -0.143 (0.294) -0.0437 (0.0867)
Foreign research institute 0.0581 (0.128) 0.266 (0.163) 0.0813 (0.0478)
Referee reports 0.215 (0.134) 0.280 (0.168) 0.0856 (0.0491)
Publications -0.0437 (0.122) 0.107 (0.156) 0.0326 (0.0458)
Third party funded project -0.0961 (0.116) -0.141 (0.148) -0.0431 (0.0437)
Prospects outside cat -0.121 (0.0831) -0.104 (0.105) -0.0316 (0.0310)
Prospects outside 5y cat 0.0327 (0.0798) 0.0415 (0.100) 0.0127 (0.0296)
Prospects academia cat 0.244 (0.0803) 0.210 (0.101) 0.0641 (0.0294)
Competition academia cat 0.192 (0.105) 0.240 (0.131) 0.0731 (0.0383)
Networks n -0.169 (0.103) -0.207 (0.129) -0.0630 (0.0377)
Conditions prospects cat 0.188 (0.0693) 0.190 (0.0875) 0.0581 (0.0255)
N 474 474 474
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=decreased
2=slightly decreased, 3=not changed, 4=slightly improved, 5=improved
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=slightly improved + improved, 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 16: How do you view your current employment prospects in jobs outside of academic
research?
(1) (2) (3)
Prospects outside Prospects outside bin Marginal eects
main
Women -0.160 (0.106) -0.112 (0.137) -0.0338 (0.0437)
Age -0.0461 (0.0152) -0.0769 (0.0222) -0.0260 (0.00689)
Partnership -0.0313 (0.130) -0.00558 (0.165) 0.00393 (0.0528)
Single 0.0829 (0.154) 0.0228 (0.201) 0.0109 (0.0641)
Other18 -0.00710 (0.310) 0.127 (0.413) 0.0419 (0.132)
One child -0.226 (0.135) -0.256 (0.175) -0.0788 (0.0557)
Two children -0.165 (0.163) -0.205 (0.210) -0.0650 (0.0669)
More children 0.00737 (0.225) 0.123 (0.288) 0.0588 (0.0922)
German 0.221 (0.183) 0.410 (0.236) 0.135 (0.0749)
Years since nal degree -0.00648 (0.0197) -0.00906 (0.0258) -0.00296 (0.00822)
Master -0.299 (0.228) -0.507 (0.292) -0.171 (0.0921)
Magister -0.325 (0.177) -0.293 (0.240) -0.102 (0.0762)
Other23 -0.145 (0.188) 0.152 (0.243) 0.0356 (0.0777)
Years since graduation 0.0165 (0.0207) 0.0434 (0.0262) 0.0154 (0.00831)
PhD in Germany 0.280 (0.228) 0.130 (0.291) 0.0260 (0.0926)
Business Studies 0.293 (0.137) 0.259 (0.171) 0.0929 (0.0541)
Sociology SocialScience -0.107 (0.157) -0.440 (0.205) -0.144 (0.0646)
Other30 0.253 (0.154) 0.0946 (0.194) 0.0352 (0.0619)
Assistant Professor -0.450 (0.195) -0.677 (0.249) -0.215 (0.0782)
Research Assistant -0.338 (0.113) -0.304 (0.146) -0.0930 (0.0459)
Status Habilitation -0.125 (0.108) -0.188 (0.138) -0.0680 (0.0439)
Lecturer Admin Ocer -0.0311 (0.152) -0.0909 (0.192) -0.0308 (0.0614)
PhD program 0.379 (0.176) 0.438 (0.225) 0.139 (0.0712)
PhD research institution 0.00510 (0.195) 0.106 (0.247) 0.0436 (0.0792)
ExternalPhd scholarship -0.246 (0.172) -0.137 (0.230) -0.0458 (0.0735)
Other27 -0.0652 (0.275) -0.174 (0.372) -0.0632 (0.119)
PhD current university 0.0751 (0.105) 0.0366 (0.134) 0.0179 (0.0429)
National conferences -0.187 (0.134) -0.193 (0.172) -0.0650 (0.0548)
International conferences 0.203 (0.127) 0.319 (0.166) 0.102 (0.0524)
German research institute -0.339 (0.206) -0.895 (0.282) -0.284 (0.0867)
Foreign research institute -0.0488 (0.116) -0.104 (0.150) -0.0317 (0.0478)
Referee reports -0.0135 (0.120) -0.0752 (0.154) -0.0267 (0.0490)
Publications 0.0976 (0.110) 0.153 (0.141) 0.0470 (0.0448)
Third party funded project 0.187 (0.103) 0.215 (0.131) 0.0736 (0.0415)
Prospects academia cat 0.0725 (0.0728) 0.00877 (0.0937) 0.0135 (0.0296)
Competition academia cat -0.0822 (0.0969) -0.126 (0.124) -0.0378 (0.0393)
Networks n 0.0227 (0.0925) 0.0979 (0.118) 0.0281 (0.0375)
Conditions prospects cat -0.0298 (0.0718) 0.00178 (0.0903) 0.0335 (0.0251)
Conditions prospects catI 0.285 (0.119) 0.348 (0.154)
N 528 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=very bad, 2=rather bad
3=average, 4=rather good, 5=very good
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=rather good + very good
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 17: How do you view your employment prospects in jobs outside of academic
research ve years from now, assuming that you continue working in an academic job?
(1) (2) (3)
Prospects outside 5y Prospects outside bin Marginal eects
main
Women -0.213 (0.106) -0.112 (0.137) -0.0237 (0.0361)
Age -0.0353 (0.0159) -0.0769 (0.0222) -0.00181 (0.00569)
Partnership -0.0275 (0.129) -0.00558 (0.165) -0.0607 (0.0462)
Single 0.181 (0.153) 0.0228 (0.201) 0.00971 (0.0534)
Other18 0.214 (0.307) 0.127 (0.413) 0.0713 (0.105)
One child -0.0746 (0.135) -0.256 (0.175) -0.0395 (0.0491)
Two children -0.0886 (0.163) -0.205 (0.210) -0.0129 (0.0567)
More children 0.177 (0.221) 0.123 (0.288) 0.0225 (0.0779)
German 0.193 (0.184) 0.410 (0.236) 0.0459 (0.0647)
Years since nal degree -0.00265 (0.0199) -0.00906 (0.0258) -0.000183 (0.00703)
Master 0.504 (0.227) -0.507 (0.292) 0.154 (0.0762)
Magister -0.133 (0.178) -0.293 (0.240) -0.00272 (0.0693)
Other23 -0.0349 (0.191) 0.152 (0.243) 0.0880 (0.0648)
Years since graduation 0.0420 (0.0205) 0.0434 (0.0262) 0.00156 (0.00718)
PhD in Germany 0.239 (0.227) 0.130 (0.291) 0.0984 (0.0843)
Business Studies 0.00912 (0.135) 0.259 (0.171) 0.0184 (0.0466)
Sociology SocialScience -0.0365 (0.157) -0.440 (0.205) -0.0458 (0.0591)
Other30 -0.0225 (0.153) 0.0946 (0.194) -0.000133 (0.0541)
Assistant Professor -0.176 (0.193) -0.677 (0.249) -0.0113 (0.0643)
Research Assistant -0.252 (0.112) -0.304 (0.146) -0.0984 (0.0387)
Status Habilitation 0.00496 (0.107) -0.188 (0.138) -0.00434 (0.0379)
Lecturer Admin Ocer -0.164 (0.151) -0.0909 (0.192) -0.0949 (0.0519)
PhD program 0.332 (0.174) 0.438 (0.225) 0.00337 (0.0622)
PhD research institution -0.141 (0.194) 0.106 (0.247) -0.118 (0.0734)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.0173 (0.172) -0.137 (0.230) -0.0620 (0.0667)
Other27 -0.0108 (0.276) -0.174 (0.372) 0.0154 (0.0945)
PhD current university 0.125 (0.104) 0.0366 (0.134) 0.0220 (0.0369)
National conferences -0.0371 (0.134) -0.193 (0.172) -0.0466 (0.0472)
International conferences -0.0938 (0.127) 0.319 (0.166) -0.00851 (0.0455)
German research institute -0.0678 (0.204) -0.895 (0.282) -0.135 (0.0855)
Foreign research institute -0.148 (0.117) -0.104 (0.150) -0.0413 (0.0415)
Referee reports -0.142 (0.119) -0.0752 (0.154) 0.0362 (0.0418)
Publications 0.220 (0.110) 0.153 (0.141) 0.0413 (0.0395)
Third party funded project 0.134 (0.102) 0.215 (0.131) 0.00598 (0.0358)
Prospects academia cat 0.0615 (0.0724) 0.00877 (0.0937) 0.0147 (0.0256)
Competition academia cat -0.240 (0.0959) -0.126 (0.124) -0.0632 (0.0317)
Networks n -0.0694 (0.0920) 0.0979 (0.118) -0.0376 (0.0326)
Conditions prospects cat 0.200 (0.0623) 0.00178 (0.0903) 0.0747 (0.0220)
Conditions prospects catI 0.348 (0.154)
N 528 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=very bad
2=rather bad, 3=average, 4=rather good, 5=very good
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=rather good + very good, 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 18: How do you assess your own prospects to successfully pursue an academic career?
(1) (2) (3)
Prospects Prospects bin Marginal eects
main
Women 0.0760 (0.109) 0.166 (0.149) 0.0476 (0.0388)
Age -0.0135 (0.0158) -0.0124 (0.0237) -0.00704 (0.00639)
Partnership -0.319 (0.134) -0.414 (0.184) -0.105 (0.0486)
Single -0.271 (0.160) -0.217 (0.222) -0.0712 (0.0586)
Other18 0.0501 (0.320) -0.122 (0.413) -0.0619 (0.111)
One child -0.347 (0.140) -0.454 (0.191) -0.123 (0.0503)
Two children -0.490 (0.167) -0.683 (0.227) -0.181 (0.0596)
More children -0.651 (0.227) -0.982 (0.333) -0.250 (0.0865)
German -0.128 (0.190) -0.104 (0.257) -0.0141 (0.0677)
Years since nal degree -0.00904 (0.0202) -0.0104 (0.0291) -0.000406 (0.00759)
Master -0.0705 (0.239) 0.191 (0.325) 0.0376 (0.0851)
Magister 0.301 (0.183) 0.363 (0.249) 0.0866 (0.0654)
Other23 0.148 (0.195) 0.261 (0.260) 0.0935 (0.0688)
Years since graduation -0.00634 (0.0221) -0.0153 (0.0320) 0.00258 (0.00779)
PhD in Germany -0.198 (0.237) -0.380 (0.323) -0.128 (0.0846)
Business Studies 0.332 (0.141) 0.224 (0.193) 0.0613 (0.0510)
Sociology SocialScience 0.169 (0.163) 0.0160 (0.222) 0.00942 (0.0591)
Other30 0.0422 (0.158) -0.128 (0.216) -0.0360 (0.0572)
Assistant Professor 0.436 (0.203) 0.988 (0.290) 0.271 (0.0752)
Research Assistant -0.134 (0.117) -0.157 (0.156) -0.0402 (0.0412)
Status Habilitation 0.445 (0.109) 0.581 (0.145) 0.160 (0.0367)
Lecturer Admin Ocer -0.0518 (0.156) -0.256 (0.213) -0.0707 (0.0558)
PhD program 0.0359 (0.182) -0.00946 (0.245) -0.0189 (0.0645)
PhD research institution 0.224 (0.202) 0.122 (0.274) 0.0343 (0.0726)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.0772 (0.176) 0.0887 (0.245) 0.0218 (0.0644)
Other27 0.378 (0.289) 0.481 (0.405) 0.128 (0.107)
PhD current university -0.285 (0.108) -0.138 (0.146) -0.0300 (0.0388)
National conferences 0.398 (0.137) 0.515 (0.187) 0.152 (0.0486)
International conferences -0.0567 (0.151) 0.129 (0.204) -0.0291 (0.0470)
German research institute -0.161 (0.212) -0.637 (0.286) -0.158 (0.0752)
Foreign research institute 0.339 (0.121) 0.206 (0.163) 0.0596 (0.0429)
Referee reports 0.331 (0.123) 0.376 (0.163) 0.102 (0.0429)
Publications 0.140 (0.113) 0.396 (0.151) 0.101 (0.0392)
Third party funded project -0.141 (0.106) -0.126 (0.144) -0.0399 (0.0381)
Prospects outside cat 0.0108 (0.0765) 0.0953 (0.104) 0.0318 (0.0274)
Prospects outside 5y cat 0.141 (0.0743) -0.0441 (0.0988) -0.00799 (0.0262)
Competition academia cat -0.0655 (0.101) -0.226 (0.137) -0.0638 (0.0361)
Networks n -0.444 (0.115) -0.603 (0.163) -0.124 (0.0333)
Conditions prospects cat 0.393 (0.0729) 0.371 (0.0967) 0.145 (0.0192)
Years since graduationI 0.0434 (0.0208) 0.0419 (0.0302)
International conferencesI -0.00995 (0.226) -0.667 (0.311)
Networks nI 0.166 (0.199) 0.545 (0.276)
Conditions prospects catI 0.356 (0.127) 0.543 (0.180)
N 528 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=very bad
2=rather bad, 3=neutral, 4=rather good, 5=very good
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=rather good + very good, 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 19: How do the conditions in your current job and your future employment prospects
aect your motivation/incentives to engage in an acedemic career?
(1) (2) (3)
Conditions Conditions bin Marginal eects
main
Women 0.0605 (0.108) 0.0173 (0.140) 0.0161 (0.0441)
Age -0.0317 (0.0165) -0.0259 (0.0221) -0.00902 (0.00703)
Partnership -0.0560 (0.132) 0.0140 (0.167) 0.00378 (0.0533)
Single -0.0781 (0.157) -0.0578 (0.201) -0.0255 (0.0638)
Other18 -0.359 (0.306) -0.157 (0.381) -0.0730 (0.123)
One child 0.00348 (0.138) 0.0563 (0.175) 0.0152 (0.0558)
Two children 0.268 (0.167) 0.334 (0.211) 0.108 (0.0669)
More children 0.427 (0.228) 0.400 (0.282) 0.127 (0.0908)
German -0.0826 (0.186) -0.107 (0.233) -0.0344 (0.0745)
Years since nal degree 0.0136 (0.0202) 0.0277 (0.0274) 0.00717 (0.00860)
Master -0.362 (0.233) -0.0806 (0.294) -0.0300 (0.0945)
Magister 0.123 (0.180) 0.166 (0.227) 0.0562 (0.0728)
Other23 0.237 (0.193) -0.0321 (0.248) -0.0222 (0.0788)
Years since graduation 0.00109 (0.0210) -0.0233 (0.0277) -0.00415 (0.00872)
PhD in Germany 0.0449 (0.227) 0.317 (0.287) 0.114 (0.0926)
Business Studies -0.0933 (0.138) -0.0654 (0.175) -0.0235 (0.0561)
Sociology SocialScience 0.0746 (0.160) 0.0417 (0.205) 0.0118 (0.0658)
Other30 -0.0730 (0.156) -0.0643 (0.197) -0.0235 (0.0629)
Assistant Professor 0.0367 (0.200) 0.321 (0.251) 0.114 (0.0802)
Research Assistant -0.0237 (0.114) 0.103 (0.145) 0.0422 (0.0465)
Status Habilitation 0.0599 (0.109) 0.109 (0.138) 0.0240 (0.0440)
Lecturer Admin Ocer 0.0192 (0.153) 0.113 (0.191) 0.0422 (0.0616)
PhD program -0.321 (0.177) -0.234 (0.222) -0.0787 (0.0708)
PhD research institution 0.341 (0.203) 0.412 (0.265) 0.134 (0.0844)
ExternalPhd scholarship -0.176 (0.174) -0.0432 (0.225) -0.00909 (0.0719)
Other27 0.0606 (0.280) -0.0339 (0.368) -0.00598 (0.117)
PhD current university -0.157 (0.126) -0.170 (0.156) -0.00458 (0.0429)
National conferences 0.165 (0.136) 0.108 (0.174) 0.0387 (0.0559)
International conferences 0.191 (0.127) 0.255 (0.162) 0.0880 (0.0518)
German research institute 0.0708 (0.209) 0.0626 (0.259) 0.0376 (0.0834)
Foreign research institute -0.101 (0.118) -0.0687 (0.148) -0.0268 (0.0476)
Referee reports -0.203 (0.121) -0.238 (0.152) -0.0790 (0.0487)
Publications -0.175 (0.111) 0.0156 (0.140) 0.00175 (0.0449)
Third party funded project 0.157 (0.104) 0.0329 (0.131) 0.00706 (0.0422)
Prospects outside cat -0.0373 (0.0754) -0.0108 (0.0966) -0.00210 (0.0309)
Prospects outside 5y cat 0.245 (0.0729) 0.157 (0.0914) 0.0518 (0.0289)
Prospects academia cat 0.517 (0.0822) 0.420 (0.102) 0.185 (0.0248)
Competition academia cat 0.143 (0.0996) 0.105 (0.126) 0.0391 (0.0397)
Networks n -0.255 (0.0925) -0.270 (0.117) -0.0854 (0.0372)
PhD current universityI 0.475 (0.208) 0.515 (0.269)
Prospects academia catI 0.300 (0.126) 0.420 (0.171)
N 528 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial):
1=strongly negative, 2=weakly negative, 3=average, 4=weakly positive, 5=strongly positive
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=weakly positive + strongly positive , 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal Eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 20: In comparison to a job outside of academic research, an academic research job
is more risky.
(1) (2)
Academic job risk, probit Academic job risk, AME
Female -0.101 (0.134) -0.0346 (0.0460)
Age 0.0303 (0.0215) 0.0103 (0.00728)
Partnership 0.279 (0.163) 0.0947 (0.0548)
Single -0.0255 (0.192) -0.00867 (0.0652)
Other family status 0.255 (0.402) 0.0867 (0.137)
One child -0.0717 (0.170) -0.0244 (0.0579)
Two children 0.265 (0.207) 0.0900 (0.0700)
More children -0.0848 (0.277) -0.0288 (0.0942)
German 0.253 (0.231) 0.0860 (0.0783)
Years since nal degree -0.0627 (0.0269) -0.0213 (0.00899)
Master -0.594 (0.296) -0.202 (0.0994)
Magister 0.0491 (0.226) 0.0167 (0.0767)
Other academic degree 0.174 (0.241) 0.0593 (0.0820)
Years since graduation 0.0187 (0.0269) 0.00636 (0.00914)
PhD in Germany -0.193 (0.301) -0.0656 (0.102)
Business Studies 0.0502 (0.171) 0.0171 (0.0581)
Sociology, Social Sciences -0.153 (0.199) -0.0519 (0.0674)
Other subject -0.0558 (0.196) -0.0190 (0.0668)
Assistant Professor -0.100 (0.248) -0.0340 (0.0843)
Research Assistant -0.00860 (0.142) -0.00292 (0.0482)
Status Habilitation 0.179 (0.135) 0.0608 (0.0459)
Lecturer, Admin, Ocer 0.0948 (0.192) 0.0322 (0.0652)
PhD program 0.327 (0.234) 0.111 (0.0792)
PhD research institution -0.0811 (0.240) -0.0276 (0.0815)
External PhD scholarship -0.0467 (0.216) -0.0159 (0.0733)
Other PhD -0.799 (0.352) -0.272 (0.118)
PhD current university -0.179 (0.131) -0.0608 (0.0444)
National conferences -0.109 (0.168) -0.0371 (0.0571)
International conferences 0.467 (0.159) 0.159 (0.0529)
German research institute -0.177 (0.259) -0.0603 (0.0881)
Foreign research institute -0.136 (0.150) -0.0462 (0.0508)
Referee reports -0.135 (0.152) -0.0458 (0.0516)
Publications 0.0553 (0.139) 0.0188 (0.0472)
Third-party project -0.0552 (0.130) -0.0188 (0.0442)
Prospects outside -0.106 (0.0951) -0.0360 (0.0322)
Prospects outside 5y -0.277 (0.0895) -0.0940 (0.0296)
Prospects academia 0.0198 (0.0917) 0.00674 (0.0312)
Competition academia 0.339 (0.121) 0.115 (0.0401)
Networks 0.0519 (0.116) 0.0176 (0.0394)
Conditions prospects -0.0299 (0.0794) -0.0102 (0.0270)
N 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=Yes 0=No
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Table 21: What kind of job will you probably have in ve years?
(1) (2) (3)
Job in5y Job in5y bin Marginal eects
main
Women -0.101 (0.118) -0.00751 (0.174) -0.00163 (0.0365)
Age 0.00424 (0.0171) 0.0165 (0.0243) 0.00358 (0.00509)
Partnership -0.178 (0.141) -0.150 (0.203) -0.0325 (0.0425)
Single -0.0229 (0.171) 0.173 (0.251) 0.0377 (0.0527)
Other18 0.100 (0.349) 0.0920 (0.479) 0.0200 (0.101)
One child 0.0708 (0.150) 0.183 (0.218) 0.0397 (0.0457)
Two children -0.158 (0.181) 0.0231 (0.265) 0.00503 (0.0558)
More children -0.0000140 (0.251) 0.579 (0.369) 0.126 (0.0770)
German -0.0729 (0.213) 0.180 (0.322) 0.0390 (0.0677)
Years since nal degree 0.0146 (0.0257) -0.0356 (0.0364) -0.00772 (0.00764)
Master 0.212 (0.259) 0.344 (0.394) 0.0748 (0.0827)
Magister 0.203 (0.197) 0.544 (0.292) 0.118 (0.0607)
Other23 0.0391 (0.216) 0.128 (0.308) 0.0278 (0.0647)
Years since graduation 0.0204 (0.0259) 0.0398 (0.0358) 0.00865 (0.00751)
PhD in Germany -0.437 (0.257) -1.092 (0.422) -0.237 (0.0868)
Business Studies 0.418 (0.151) 0.391 (0.223) 0.0849 (0.0464)
Sociology SocialScience 0.300 (0.174) 0.373 (0.251) 0.0811 (0.0525)
Other30 0.331 (0.170) 0.414 (0.250) 0.0899 (0.0521)
Assistant Professor 0.206 (0.222) 0.697 (0.367) 0.151 (0.0765)
Research Assistant -0.170 (0.123) -0.344 (0.174) -0.0748 (0.0361)
Status Habilitation 0.313 (0.117) 0.322 (0.165) 0.0700 (0.0344)
Lecturer Admin Ocer 0.456 (0.172) 0.489 (0.252) 0.106 (0.0524)
PhD program -0.281 (0.193) -0.340 (0.273) -0.0738 (0.0572)
PhD research institution -0.161 (0.221) -0.295 (0.328) -0.0640 (0.0687)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.142 (0.187) 0.231 (0.263) 0.0503 (0.0553)
Other27 -0.221 (0.340) -0.485 (0.503) -0.105 (0.106)
PhD current university -0.154 (0.115) 0.151 (0.168) 0.0327 (0.0351)
National conferences -0.149 (0.149) -0.123 (0.218) -0.0266 (0.0457)
International conferences 0.195 (0.140) 0.325 (0.198) 0.0705 (0.0414)
German research institute -0.358 (0.227) -0.138 (0.320) -0.0300 (0.0672)
Foreign research institute -0.0361 (0.127) -0.144 (0.186) -0.0312 (0.0391)
Referee reports 0.167 (0.133) 0.158 (0.189) 0.0343 (0.0395)
Publications -0.0644 (0.120) -0.141 (0.174) -0.0307 (0.0366)
Third party funded project 0.158 (0.113) 0.189 (0.166) 0.0411 (0.0347)
Prospects outside cat -0.277 (0.0826) -0.411 (0.122) -0.0893 (0.0249)
Prospects outside 5y cat 0.0517 (0.0789) -0.0298 (0.112) -0.00647 (0.0236)
Prospects academia cat 0.770 (0.0809) 0.865 (0.111) 0.188 (0.0192)
Competition academia cat 0.148 (0.106) -0.0424 (0.151) -0.00920 (0.0317)
Networks n -0.367 (0.102) -0.241 (0.145) -0.0524 (0.0303)
Conditions prospects cat 0.285 (0.0676) 0.431 (0.0928) 0.0936 (0.0182)
N 498 498 498
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=a job outside of academic research
2=rather a job outside of academic research
3=no preference, 4=rather an academic research job, 5=an academic research job
Values of the dependent variable (binary):
1=rather an academic research job + an academic research job, 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 22: If you could choose, what kind of job would you select at present?
(1) (2) (3)
Choice Choice bin Marginal eects
main
Women -0.000778 (0.119) 0.0899 (0.165) 0.0212 (0.0350)
Age 0.0124 (0.0178) 0.0275 (0.0257) 0.00575 (0.00566)
Partnership -0.103 (0.145) -0.194 (0.199) -0.0485 (0.0433)
Single 0.00875 (0.173) -0.179 (0.237) -0.0421 (0.0513)
Other18 -0.196 (0.334) -0.817 (0.412) -0.215 (0.0880)
One child 0.250 (0.155) 0.288 (0.215) 0.0594 (0.0469)
Two children -0.0517 (0.184) -0.217 (0.247) -0.0507 (0.0537)
More children 0.0766 (0.242) 0.295 (0.327) 0.0708 (0.0716)
German 0.111 (0.210) -0.0975 (0.299) -0.00626 (0.0639)
Years since nal degree -0.00516 (0.0213) -0.0308 (0.0303) -0.00651 (0.00665)
Master 0.359 (0.269) 0.281 (0.386) 0.0572 (0.0815)
Magister 0.296 (0.205) 0.400 (0.297) 0.0891 (0.0644)
Other23 0.217 (0.227) -0.153 (0.305) -0.00734 (0.0660)
Years since graduation -0.0151 (0.0223) -0.00752 (0.0312) -0.00220 (0.00686)
PhD in Germany 0.186 (0.252) 0.00169 (0.366) -0.0130 (0.0787)
Business Studies 0.317 (0.153) 0.442 (0.211) 0.0904 (0.0450)
Sociology SocialScience 0.199 (0.175) 0.309 (0.238) 0.0685 (0.0517)
Other30 0.298 (0.172) 0.383 (0.236) 0.0809 (0.0509)
Assistant Professor 0.287 (0.228) 0.133 (0.298) 0.0254 (0.0648)
Research Assistant -0.0753 (0.126) -0.154 (0.170) -0.0382 (0.0368)
Status Habilitation 0.313 (0.120) 0.543 (0.165) 0.125 (0.0346)
Lecturer Admin Ocer 0.0698 (0.169) 0.320 (0.243) 0.0681 (0.0524)
PhD program 0.212 (0.198) 0.334 (0.272) 0.0598 (0.0581)
PhD research institution 0.0983 (0.226) 0.344 (0.307) 0.0584 (0.0659)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.424 (0.197) 1.069 (0.312) 0.244 (0.0656)
Other27 0.529 (0.352) 0.435 (0.464) 0.113 (0.101)
PhD current university 0.0209 (0.117) 0.0349 (0.158) 0.0124 (0.0344)
National conferences -0.192 (0.150) -0.151 (0.210) -0.0274 (0.0454)
International conferences 0.269 (0.141) 0.403 (0.190) 0.0902 (0.0410)
German research institute 0.0349 (0.231) 0.0193 (0.314) 0.0112 (0.0675)
Foreign research institute 0.0463 (0.134) 0.245 (0.187) 0.0490 (0.0405)
Referee reports -0.0272 (0.133) -0.141 (0.180) -0.0319 (0.0392)
Publications -0.0754 (0.121) -0.0849 (0.166) -0.0166 (0.0360)
Third party funded project 0.272 (0.116) 0.224 (0.159) 0.0501 (0.0342)
Prospects outside cat -0.284 (0.0828) -0.381 (0.113) -0.0857 (0.0238)
Prospects outside 5y cat -0.0552 (0.0809) -0.0252 (0.110) -0.00543 (0.0238)
Prospects academia cat 0.644 (0.0801) 0.725 (0.108) 0.162 (0.0204)
Competition academia cat 0.0573 (0.109) 0.103 (0.149) 0.0144 (0.0320)
Networks n -0.311 (0.122) -0.490 (0.170) -0.0548 (0.0294)
Conditions prospects cat 0.344 (0.0689) 0.377 (0.0908) 0.0793 (0.0188)
Networks nI 0.222 (0.203) 0.700 (0.278)
N 528 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=a job outside of academic research
2=rather a job outside of academic research
3=no preference, 4=rather an academic research job, 5=an academic research job
Values of the dependent variable (binary):
1=rather an academic research job + an academic research job , 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 23: Average marginal eects for probit regressions of conditions and academic job
Dependent Conditions improve Academic Research Select Academic
Variable engagement in Job in 5 yearsb Job at Presentc
academic careera
Female 0.0161 (0.0456) -0.00162 (0.0374) 0.0212 (0.0366)
Age -0.00902 (0.00727) 0.00354 (0.00521) 0.00575 (0.00585)
Partnership 0.00378 (0.0551) -0.0322 (0.0436) -0.0485 (0.0447)
Single -0.0255 (0.0660) 0.0373 (0.0540) -0.0421 (0.0530)
Other family status -0.0730 (0.127) 0.0198 (0.103) -0.215 (0.0910)
One child 0.0152 (0.0577) 0.0393 (0.0468) 0.0594 (0.0485)
Two children 0.108 (0.0691) 0.00497 (0.0571) -0.0507 (0.0555)
More children 0.127 (0.0939) 0.125 (0.0788) 0.0708 (0.0741)
German -0.0344 (0.0770) 0.0386 (0.0692) -0.00626 (0.0661)
Years since nal degree 0.00717 (0.00890) -0.00764 (0.00781) -0.00651 (0.00687)
Master -0.0300 (0.0977) 0.0740 (0.0847) 0.0572 (0.0843)
Magister 0.0562 (0.0753) 0.117 (0.0622) 0.0891 (0.0667)
Other academic degree -0.0222 (0.0815) 0.0276 (0.0663) -0.00734 (0.0682)
Years since graduation -0.00415 (0.00902) 0.00856 (0.00768) -0.00220 (0.00709)
PhD in Germany 0.114 (0.0958) -0.235 (0.0888) -0.0130 (0.0813)
Business Studies -0.0235 (0.0580) 0.0840 (0.0475) 0.0904 (0.0466)
Sociology, Social Sciences 0.0118 (0.0680) 0.0803 (0.0537) 0.0685 (0.0534)
Other subject -0.0235 (0.0650) 0.0889 (0.0532) 0.0809 (0.0526)
Assistant Professor 0.114 (0.0829) 0.150 (0.0784) 0.0254 (0.0670)
Research Assistant 0.0422 (0.0481) -0.0740 (0.0370) -0.0382 (0.0380)
Status Habilitation 0.0240 (0.0455) 0.0693 (0.0352) 0.125 (0.0359)
Lecturer, Admin, Ocer 0.0422 (0.0637) 0.105 (0.0536) 0.0681 (0.0542)
PhD program -0.0787 (0.0732) -0.0730 (0.0585) 0.0598 (0.0601)
PhD research institution 0.134 (0.0873) -0.0634 (0.0703) 0.0584 (0.0681)
External PhD scholarship -0.00909 (0.0743) 0.0498 (0.0565) 0.244 (0.0679)
Other PhD -0.00598 (0.121) -0.104 (0.108) 0.113 (0.105)
PhD current university -0.00458 (0.0443) 0.0324 (0.0360) 0.0124 (0.0356)
National conferences 0.0387 (0.0578) -0.0264 (0.0468) -0.0274 (0.0470)
International conferences 0.0880 (0.0535) 0.0698 (0.0423) 0.0902 (0.0425)
German research institute 0.0376 (0.0862) -0.0297 (0.0688) 0.0112 (0.0698)
Foreign research institute -0.0268 (0.0492) -0.0309 (0.0400) 0.0490 (0.0419)
Referee reports -0.0790 (0.0504) 0.0340 (0.0405) -0.0319 (0.0405)
Publications 0.00175 (0.0464) -0.0304 (0.0375) -0.0166 (0.0372)
Third-party project 0.00706 (0.0437) 0.0407 (0.0356) 0.0501 (0.0354)
Prospects outside -0.00210 (0.0320) -0.0884 (0.0255) -0.0857 (0.0246)
Prospects outside 5y 0.0518 (0.0299) -0.00641 (0.0241) -0.00543 (0.0246)
Prospects academia 0.185 (0.0257) 0.186 (0.0194) 0.162 (0.0211)
Competition academia 0.0391 (0.0410) -0.00911 (0.0324) 0.0144 (0.0331)
Networks -0.0854 (0.0385) -0.0518 (0.0310) -0.0548 (0.0305)
Conditions prospects 0.0926 (0.0187) 0.0793 (0.0194)
N 528 498 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
a: Dependent Variable: conditions improve research incentives weakly or strongly positive.
b: Dependent Variable: (rather) will have academic research job in 5 years.
c: Dependent Variable: (rather) select academic research job at present.
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 24: Do you pursue applied research in order to improve your career prospects in
jobs outside of academic research?
Applied research Applied research Applied research
Applied research
Women -0.0212 (0.120) 0.00584 (0.118) 0.0131 (0.112)
Age 0.0342 (0.0202) 0.0326 (0.0195) 0.0214 (0.0190)
Partnership 0.256 (0.142) 0.186 (0.140) 0.174 (0.137)
Single -0.151 (0.169) -0.187 (0.165) -0.154 (0.161)
Other18 0.597 (0.391) 0.534 (0.386) 0.302 (0.370)
One child 0.160 (0.151) 0.133 (0.148) 0.143 (0.145)
Two children -0.0524 (0.179) -0.0297 (0.176) -0.0190 (0.170)
More children -0.265 (0.247) -0.232 (0.242) -0.153 (0.236)
German -0.00123 (0.203) -0.150 (0.200) -0.0202 (0.191)
Years since nal degree 0.0298 (0.0264) 0.0183 (0.0260) 0.00712 (0.0252)
Master -0.357 (0.250) -0.202 (0.243) -0.149 (0.236)
Magister 0.123 (0.202) 0.273 (0.198) 0.256 (0.188)
Other23 -0.186 (0.213) -0.0587 (0.209) 0.0137 (0.199)
Years since graduation -0.0484 (0.0261) -0.0334 (0.0256) -0.0121 (0.0245)
PhD in Germany -0.0323 (0.247) -0.124 (0.243) -0.222 (0.215)
Business Studies 0.00561 (0.153) -0.109 (0.147) -0.280 (0.134)
Sociology SocialScience 0.326 (0.178) 0.261 (0.173) 0.156 (0.164)
Other30 0.136 (0.167) 0.0106 (0.163) -0.0224 (0.156)
Assistant Professor 0.00151 (0.256) 0.228 (0.248)
Research Assistant 0.0147 (0.125) 0.0674 (0.122)
Status Habilitation -0.205 (0.139) -0.0424 (0.133)
Lecturer Admin Ocer 0.263 (0.166) 0.300 (0.163)
PhD program 0.201 (0.192) 0.0414 (0.187)
PhD research institution 0.531 (0.212) 0.546 (0.209)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.128 (0.196) 0.221 (0.193)
Other27 0.0681 (0.317) 0.201 (0.313)
PhD current university -0.136 (0.116) -0.0993 (0.114)
National conferences -0.356 (0.150) -0.0916 (0.141)
International conferences 0.225 (0.140) 0.202 (0.137)
German research institute 0.0716 (0.228) -0.00603 (0.222)
Foreign research institute -0.0325 (0.125) -0.0292 (0.123)
Referee reports 0.192 (0.131) 0.246 (0.128)
Publications 0.0556 (0.121) 0.0294 (0.119)
Third party funded project -0.127 (0.133) -0.182 (0.131)
Prospects outside cat -0.256 (0.0844)
Prospects outside 5y cat 0.0364 (0.0797)
Prospects academia cat 0.183 (0.0797)
Competition academia cat 0.0918 (0.107)
Networks n -0.279 (0.103)
Conditions prospects cat 0.171 (0.0682)
Assistant ProfessorI 0.626 (0.384) 0.607 (0.376)
Status HabilitationI 0.647 (0.247) 0.471 (0.243)
Third party funded projectI -0.377 (0.231) -0.357 (0.228)
N 475 476 476
Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial):
1=that's right, this is one reason why I pursue only applied research
2=that's right, this is one reason why I pursue applied research in addition to basic research
3=that's wrong, I pursue applied research, but for other reasons 4=that's wrong, I pursue only basic research
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 25: Average marginal eects for probit regressions of assessments of competition
and networks
Dependent Competition in Networks are more
variable academic elda importantb
Female -0.0388 (0.0412) 0.0390 (0.0409)
Age 0.00256 (0.00637) -0.000648 (0.00551)
Partnership 0.0126 (0.0478) -0.0274 (0.0488)
Single 0.171 (0.0599) 0.0671 (0.0568)
Other family status 0.299 (0.165) 0.110 (0.108)
One child 0.0879 (0.0518) 0.0216 (0.0506)
Two children 0.0144 (0.0590) -0.00942 (0.0616)
More children 0.181 (0.0855) -0.0724 (0.0835)
German -0.120 (0.0770) 0.0485 (0.0715)
Years since nal degree -0.00789 (0.00804) 0.0117 (0.00791)
Master -0.0515 (0.0893) -0.0526 (0.0951)
Magister 0.111 (0.0692) 0.0727 (0.0617)
Other academic degree 0.128 (0.0761) 0.0438 (0.0700)
Years since graduation -0.00155 (0.00806) -0.0102 (0.00808)
PhD in Germany -0.233 (0.106) -0.00256 (0.0890)
Business Studies -0.0596 (0.0513) 0.0274 (0.0535)
Sociology, Social Sciences -0.00323 (0.0605) 0.106 (0.0580)
Other subject -0.000216 (0.0593) 0.131 (0.0572)
Assistant Professor 0.131 (0.0763) 0.106 (0.0724)
Research Assistant 0.0292 (0.0427) -0.0669 (0.0420)
Status Habilitation 0.0860 (0.0408) 0.0330 (0.0405)
Lecturer, Admin, Ocer 0.0290 (0.0572) 0.0255 (0.0567)
PhD program -0.0181 (0.0708) -0.0134 (0.0662)
PhD research institution -0.0486 (0.0710) -0.0462 (0.0755)
External PhD scholarship 0.0542 (0.0678) 0.0231 (0.0607)
Other PhD -0.0548 (0.113) -0.0683 (0.105)
PhD current university -0.0213 (0.0394) -0.0672 (0.0385)
National conferences 0.0675 (0.0515) -0.0576 (0.0486)
International conferences -0.125 (0.0476) -0.0355 (0.0464)
German research institute -0.0298 (0.0776) -0.0128 (0.0795)
Foreign research institute -0.00331 (0.0445) 0.0326 (0.0442)
Referee reports 0.140 (0.0442) -0.0342 (0.0452)
Publications 0.0186 (0.0421) 0.00635 (0.0403)
Third-party project -0.0403 (0.0400) 0.0179 (0.0385)
Prospects outside -0.00301 (0.0282) 0.0264 (0.0273)
Prospects outside 5y -0.0436 (0.0264) -0.0127 (0.0274)
Prospects academia 0.0164 (0.0250) -0.100 (0.0249)
Networks 0.00156 (0.0352)
Competition academia -0.0236 (0.0363)
Conditions prospects -0.0694 (0.0222)
N 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
a: Dependent Variable: competition for academic career strong or very strong.
b: Dependent Variable: networks are more important than academic excellence.
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 26: How strong is the competition for a successful academic career in your eld?
(1) (2) (3)
Competition Competition bin Marginal eects
main
Women -0.0743 (0.111) -0.129 (0.150) -0.0395 (0.0409)
Age 0.00161 (0.0160) 0.00727 (0.0233) 0.00274 (0.00614)
Partnership 0.0278 (0.134) 0.0371 (0.179) 0.0135 (0.0461)
Single 0.464 (0.161) 0.609 (0.226) 0.174 (0.0579)
Other18 0.733 (0.336) 1.346 (0.649) 0.308 (0.161)
One child 0.226 (0.170) 0.662 (0.247) 0.0878 (0.0501)
Two children -0.0465 (0.169) -0.00750 (0.219) 0.0112 (0.0571)
More children 0.267 (0.231) 0.654 (0.321) 0.175 (0.0829)
German -0.251 (0.193) -0.372 (0.282) -0.118 (0.0743)
Years since nal degree -0.0138 (0.0204) -0.0161 (0.0289) -0.00807 (0.00775)
Master -0.219 (0.241) -0.163 (0.326) -0.0475 (0.0863)
Magister 0.295 (0.186) 0.416 (0.256) 0.109 (0.0669)
Other23 0.480 (0.203) 0.553 (0.286) 0.130 (0.0737)
Years since graduation -0.00903 (0.0215) -0.0216 (0.0297) -0.00139 (0.00778)
PhD in Germany -0.412 (0.240) -0.835 (0.392) -0.233 (0.102)
Business Studies -0.103 (0.142) -0.246 (0.190) -0.0576 (0.0496)
Sociology SocialScience 0.0215 (0.165) -0.0744 (0.224) -0.00256 (0.0584)
Other30 -0.113 (0.160) -0.00885 (0.218) 0.000557 (0.0573)
Assistant Professor 0.367 (0.205) 0.470 (0.283) 0.130 (0.0738)
Research Assistant -0.00303 (0.118) 0.0774 (0.158) 0.0273 (0.0413)
Status Habilitation 0.202 (0.111) 0.307 (0.153) 0.0853 (0.0394)
Lecturer Admin Ocer 0.140 (0.159) 0.125 (0.211) 0.0271 (0.0553)
PhD program -0.0696 (0.184) 0.0534 (0.261) -0.0124 (0.0688)
PhD research institution -0.126 (0.203) -0.245 (0.262) -0.0526 (0.0688)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.0969 (0.180) 0.207 (0.248) 0.0520 (0.0653)
Other27 -0.268 (0.288) -0.123 (0.425) -0.0572 (0.109)
PhD current university -0.0480 (0.109) -0.0933 (0.145) -0.0210 (0.0381)
National conferences 0.122 (0.140) 0.249 (0.193) 0.0668 (0.0497)
International conferences -0.341 (0.133) -0.505 (0.180) -0.128 (0.0460)
German research institute -0.196 (0.215) -0.234 (0.285) -0.0336 (0.0749)
Foreign research institute 0.0676 (0.122) -0.0527 (0.166) -0.00262 (0.0430)
Referee reports 0.236 (0.124) 0.580 (0.170) 0.143 (0.0428)
Publications 0.125 (0.115) 0.100 (0.156) 0.0202 (0.0407)
Third party funded project -0.0786 (0.108) -0.171 (0.149) -0.0420 (0.0387)
Prospects outside cat 0.0325 (0.0775) -0.0341 (0.105) -0.00338 (0.0272)
Prospects outside 5y cat -0.180 (0.0749) -0.205 (0.0986) -0.0467 (0.0257)
Prospects academia cat -0.118 (0.0868) -0.178 (0.116) 0.00739 (0.0259)
Networks n -0.0123 (0.0970) -0.00317 (0.132) 0.00493 (0.0342)
Conditions prospects cat 0.0148 (0.0654) 0.0559 (0.0877) 0.0217 (0.0228)
One childI -0.264 (0.258) -0.961 (0.357)
Prospects academia catI 0.438 (0.128) 0.600 (0.171)
N 528 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial): 1=very weak
2=weak, 3=average, 4=strong, 5=very strong
Values of the dependent variable (binary): 1=strong + very strong, 0=other
(1): Ordered Probit, (2): Probit, (3): Marginal eects of Probit(2)
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 27: What is the importance of networking (networks) to pursue an academic career?
(1) (2) (3)
Networks Networks bin1 Marginal eects
main
Women 0.128 (0.124) -0.245 (0.283) -0.0166 (0.0217)
Age -0.000191 (0.0179) -0.0182 (0.0424) -0.00190 (0.00429)
Partnership -0.147 (0.151) 0.230 (0.306) 0.0236 (0.0311)
Single 0.0325 (0.179) 0.590 (0.341) 0.0627 (0.0346)
Other18 0.0518 (0.353) 0.858 (0.598) 0.0854 (0.0597)
One child -0.0332 (0.158) 0.466 (0.319) 0.0362 (0.0320)
Two children -0.179 (0.191) 0.603 (0.358) 0.0633 (0.0361)
More children -0.239 (0.260) 0.472 (0.518) 0.0375 (0.0531)
German 0.0803 (0.214) 0.296 (0.428) 0.0237 (0.0424)
Years since nal degree 0.0323 (0.0234) -0.00976 (0.0504) -0.000737 (0.00518)
Master -0.350 (0.268) 0.640 (0.430) 0.0674 (0.0434)
Magister 0.210 (0.205) -0.0983 (0.459) -0.00313 (0.0456)
Other23 0.238 (0.223) -0.626 (0.672) -0.0646 (0.0679)
Years since graduation -0.0310 (0.0245) 0.0389 (0.0535) 0.00416 (0.00538)
PhD in Germany 0.0327 (0.265) -0.348 (0.424) -0.0281 (0.0430)
Business Studies 0.417 (0.159) -1.185 (0.310) -0.123 (0.0318)
Sociology SocialScience 0.536 (0.185) -1.129 (0.394) -0.104 (0.0379)
Other30 0.510 (0.178) -0.663 (0.299) -0.0641 (0.0304)
Assistant Professor 0.0773 (0.225) 0.572 (0.364) 0.0583 (0.0376)
Research Assistant -0.184 (0.132) 0.210 (0.275) 0.0188 (0.0281)
Status Habilitation 0.147 (0.125) -0.316 (0.251) -0.0263 (0.0252)
Lecturer Admin Ocer -0.215 (0.175) 0.921 (0.311) 0.0950 (0.0321)
PhD program -0.0890 (0.203) 0.0919 (0.344) 0.0102 (0.0351)
PhD research institution -0.100 (0.227) 0.131 (0.389) 0.00684 (0.0395)
ExternalPhd scholarship 0.116 (0.200) -0.0676 (0.427) -0.0196 (0.0445)
Other27 -0.0354 (0.320) -0.510 (0.713) -0.0504 (0.0721)
PhD current university -0.115 (0.121) -0.00928 (0.246) -0.00516 (0.0246)
National conferences -0.221 (0.155) 0.263 (0.304) 0.0266 (0.0311)
International conferences -0.00454 (0.148) -0.409 (0.301) -0.0424 (0.0304)
German research institute 0.150 (0.243) -0.612 (0.562) -0.0698 (0.0563)
Foreign research institute 0.0125 (0.135) 0.201 (0.250) 0.0251 (0.0253)
Referee reports -0.0198 (0.159) 0.222 (0.303) -0.00716 (0.0269)
Publications -0.0821 (0.152) -0.0768 (0.289) 0.0140 (0.0255)
Third party funded project 0.0398 (0.119) 0.00825 (0.221) 0.00407 (0.0225)
Prospects outside cat 0.0759 (0.0859) 0.0615 (0.172) 0.00225 (0.0174)
Prospects outside 5y cat -0.0933 (0.0837) 0.208 (0.161) 0.0219 (0.0164)
Prospects academia cat -0.346 (0.0976) 0.152 (0.189) 0.0279 (0.0172)
Competition academia cat -0.0255 (0.114) -0.219 (0.208) -0.0182 (0.0211)
Conditions prospects cat -0.138 (0.0845) 0.221 (0.169) 0.0124 (0.0148)
N 528 528 528
Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses
Values of the dependent variable (categorial):
1=Academic excellence is much more important than networks for a successful academic career
2=In addition to academic excellence,
networks are about equally important for a successful academic career
3=Networks are much more important than academic excellence for a successful academic career
Values of the dependent variable (binary1):
1=Academic excellence is much more important than networks for a successful academic career, 0=other
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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